No  Dilettante Affair : Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools by Mueller, Janice M.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 76 Number 1 
1-1-2001 
No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception 
to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools 
Janice M. Mueller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent 
Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (2001). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol76/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright 0 2001 by Washington Law Review Association
NO "DILETTANTE AFFAIR": RETHINKING THE
EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION TO PATENT
INFRINGEMENT FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH TOOLS
Janice M. Mueller*
Abstract: Scientists who require multiple "research tools" (i.e., laboratory resources such as
transgenic animals and biological receptors) to develop new drugs and medical diagnostic
products are frequently finding that these tools are patented or subject to other proprietary
constraints. Stacking royalty obligations and heightened transaction costs resulting from the
proliferation of patents on research tools threaten to slow or stop the development of new drugs
and devices critical to public health. Because U.S. courts have very narrowly interpreted the
common law "experimental use" defense of patent law as limited to "dilettante" uses of
inventions for mere "amusement" or "philosophical" inquiry, scientists face the daunting choice
of either negotiating numerous licenses or risking the possibility that their research and
development will be enjoined. In response to this dilemma of mounting transaction costs and
increasingly restricted access to patented research tools, this Article argues for a broadened rule
of "development use" that would permit scientists to use certain patented research tools without
prior authorization, but require that the research tool patent owner be paid an ex post royalty
based on the ultimate commercial success of the new drugs orotherproducts developed through
use of the tool. This "reach-through" royalty approach maintains incentives forthe development
and patenting of new research tools, but alleviates the access restrictions and up-front costs
currently associated with their acquisition and use.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The thermostable enzyme Thermus aquaticus YT1 DNA polymerase
(Taq)' is a basic and widely used biotechnology tool. Purified and isolated
from a bacterium discovered in the hot springs of Yellowstone National
Park,2 a small amount of Taq is added to the test tube every time a forensic
scientist analyzes blood from a crime scene or a laboratory technician tests
an AIDS patient's HIV levels.' Taq is also widely used in DNA
sequencing.4 In both its native and recombinant forms, Taq is patented.5 In
1. The identification, purification, and introduction of Taq are described in PAUL RABINOW,
MAKING PCR: A STORY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 128-32 (1996).
2. Bruce Rubenstein, ComplicatedlP Suit Raises Fears Among Researchers: Litigation Progresses
Over Important Biotech Tool, CORP. LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 1998, at 28.
3. Tom Abate, Drug Companies Battle Over Patentfor Enzyme Used in DNA Testing, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 31, 2000, at B 1.
4. All Things Considered: Court Calls Biotechnology Patent Into Question (National Public Radio
broadcast, Aug. 14, 1996), at 1996 WL 12726284 (statement of ProMega official Randy Diamond that
over half of world's life science research laboratories use Taq "in either the PCR process or in DNA
sequencing").
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1991, the Swiss pharmaceutical giant Hoffinan-La Roche (Roche) obtained
from the now-defunct Cetus Corporation the patent rights in Taq as well as
polymerase chain reaction or "PCR," the revolutionary DNA amplification
process that utilizes Taq.6
By means of an unprecedented federal court filing in May 1995, Roche
accused more than forty U.S. universities and research institutes (including
Harvard, Stanford, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Salk
Institute, the Scripps Research Institute, and the National Cancer Institute)
and more than 200 individual scientists of infringing these patents.7 The
scientists' alleged wrongdoing was purchasing Taq for use in the PCR
process from a bioscience supply company that, according to Roche, did
not have a proper license to sell Taq for use in PCR.' Roche officials
professed no concern about the use ofTaq for "pure research" purposes, but
stated that they felt compelled to take action against those scientists
engaged in what Roche termed "highly practical" research with profit-
making potential.9 Although Roche officials denied any intent to formally
join the scientists as parties to Roche's ongoing patent litigation against the
Taq supplier, Promega Corporation of Wisconsin, a Roche spokesperson
obliquely warned that she "wouldn't want to predict what action Roche
would take relative to any patent.., in the future."10 At a San Francisco
press conference hastily called by Promega in the days following Roche's
filing, Nobel laureate Dr. Arthur Kornberg of Stanford University decried
Roche's attempts to restrict the use of Taq and PCR technology as
"violat[ing] practices and principles basic to the advancement of
knowledge for the public welfare."' 1
6. Service, supra note 5, at 2251. The discovery of Taq, which can withstand repeated heating
cycles, made it possible to fully automate the PCR process. MAXIM D. FRANK-KAMENETSKII,
UNRAVELING DNA 133-34 (1997). PCR selectively and exponentially amplifies (or multiplies) a
specific region of DNA, producing quantities of DNA sufficient for experimentation and analysis.
KARL DRLICA, UNDERSTANDING DNA AND GENE CLONING: A GUIDEFORTHE CURIOUS 153-57,314
(3d ed. 1997). The invention of PCR is detailed in RABINOW, supra note 1.
7. See generally LaRoche, supra note 5; see also Mario C. Aguilera, Local Institutes Named in
Lawsuit, SAN DIEGO DAILY TRANSCRIPT, May 25, 1995, at 1; Marcia Barinaga, Scientists Named in
PCR Suit, 268 SCIENCE 1273, 1273 (1995).
8. Bruce Rubenstein, La Roche and Promega in Tug of War Over Enzyme; DNA-Testing Tool Patent
at Issue, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 1996, at 15.
9. Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 28.
10. Barinaga, supra note 7, at 1274.
11. Hoffman-La Roche Challenges Freedom ofResearchers; List of "Infringers "Includes Hundreds
of Researchers and Dozens of Government-Supported Laboratories, BUS. WIRE, May 24, 1995.
Washington Law Review Vol. 76:1, 2001
Roche's naming of hundreds of prominent scientists as potential patent
infringers dramatically underscores the current debate over proprietary
rights in biomedical "research tools," the many varied resources used by
scientists to conduct research and development of new drugs, therapies,
diagnostic methods, and other therapeutic products.1 2 At bottom, the
dispute stems from the broad rights conferred by the patents covering these
tools. A U.S. patent grants its owner the right, inter alia, to prevent others
from using the patented invention, without qualification as to the nature or
purpose of the use. 3 Non-consensual uses of patented inventions that lead
to the development of other products may result in patent infringement
liability, even though sales of these products do not involve selling the
patented invention. For example, a researcher may infringe if he or she uses
without a license 4 a patented research tool, such as Taq, a biological
receptor, 5 or a transgenic animal model 6 in the research and development
12. "Research tools" are further defined in Part II infra.
13. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994) ("Every patent shall contain ... a grant to the patentee... of the
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States or importing the invention into the United States ... .') (emphasis added); id. § 271 (a)
("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or
sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.") (emphasis added).
14. The "use" contemplated by § 271(a) as an act of infringement is limited by the statute to use
"without authority." Id. By contrast, "use" of a patented device legally purchased is not infringement.
A purchaser is deemed to have obtained an implied license to use the purchased patented device. Aro
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476,484 (1964) ("l]t is fundamental that sale
of a patented article by the patentee or under his authority carries with it an 'implied license to use."')
(citing Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873)). The limits of authorized "use" are
informed by the "permissible repair" versus "infringing reconstruction" debate. See Hewlett-Packard
Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445, 1451-52 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
15. See John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking In Light of Patent Breadth and
Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 449, 451 (1997) (suggesting scenario in which firm
obtaining patent protection on biological receptor useful in schizophrenia research could preempt
others from further research in schizophrenia, without itself having any truly "marketable product');
see also Eliot Marshall, Patent on HIV Receptor Provokes an Outcry, 287 SCIENCE 1375, 1375-77
(2000) (describing academic researchers' criticism of patent issued to Human Genome Sciences, Inc.
(HGS) on CCR5 cell-surface receptor that HIV uses as cell entry point, and reporting HGS's position
that it will enforce patent against "anyone [who] wants to use the receptor to create a drug'). A
"receptor" is a portion of a cell's surface that binds with specific molecules "like a lock accepting a
key." Human Pheromone Link May Have Been Found, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2000, at A22.
16. For example, U.S. Patent No. 5,675,060 (issued Oct. 7, 1997) ("Transgenic arthritic mice
expressing a T-cell receptor transgene') discloses and claims transgenic arthritic mice that are useful as
animal models for the evaluation of human arthritogenic and therapeutic anti-arthritic compositions.
Genetically altered mice are preferred models for many human diseases because the mouse genome is
similar to the human genome. David Malakoff, The Rise of the Mouse, Biomedicine's Model Mammal,
SCIENCE, Apr. 14, 2000, at 248.
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of new drugs, therapies, or diagnostic products to be sold commercially.
"Use" liability arises under the patent laws even though the researcher has
not physically incorporated the patented tool into the new product that is
ultimately marketed. 7
Many industrialized countries recognize an exception to patent
infringement liability for non-consensual uses of patented inventions for
experimental or research purposes. 8 An experimental use exception has
met with little success in the United States, however. 9 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has grudgingly recognized the existence of
a common law experimental use defense, but characterizes it as "truly
narrow" and applicable only to trifling "dilettante affairs."'2 Banished from
the experimental use defense is any activity viewed as "commercialization"
or otherwise grounded on profit motive.2' The current narrow interpretation
of the doctrine virtually assures that it cannot be relied on by the rapidly
growing number of university and industry collaborations whose research
and development efforts are ultimately targeted at the commercialization of
new biomedical products.'
The shortcomings of the experimental use doctrine as currently
interpreted in the United States are receiving increasing attention in a
climate of heightened concern over access to patented research tools. The
explosion ofbiotechnological and biomedical research and development in
the United States in the past twenty years,' with a corresponding increase
17. Because the patented research tool is not incorporated into the commercial product, the
researcher has not violated the "sells" prohibition of 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a). See supra note 13.
18. Part V infra examines the implementation of the experimental use doctrine in foreign patent
laws.
19. Part III infra details the judicial treatment of the experimental use doctrine in U.S. courts.
20. Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
21. E.g., Roche, 733 F.2d at 863 (refusing to adopt broader view of experimental use doctrine that
would "allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of 'scientific inquiry,' when that inquiry has
definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes"); Pitcaim v. United States, 547 F.2d
1106, 1125-26 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (rejecting government's experimental use defense because government's
unauthorized use of infringing helicopters for testing, demonstrations, and experiments was "in
keeping with the legitimate business of the using agency"); Deuterium Corp. v. United States, 19 Cl.
CL 624, 633 (1990) (Rader, J.) (rejecting experimental use defense because government agency's
participation in demonstration project with for-profit partner corporation "was not strictly intellectual
experimentation, but development of technology and processes for commercial applications").
22. See Part IV infra.
23. The U.S. Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, which
upheld the patentability of a living, genetically engineered bacterium, see id. at 318, is generally
viewed as having given the green light to the U.S. biotechnology industry. The initial public offering
of Genentech, Inc. in October, 1980, is also considered a watershed event in biotechnology
commercialization. Lynne G. Zucker et al., Geographically Localized Knowledge: Spillovers or
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in patenting activity,24 particularly in the area of genomics,25 has
concomitantly heightened difficulties of access to and dissemination of
patented research tools. 26 Burgeoning research and development will
Markets?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 65 (1998). By 1998, there were reportedly 1,283 biotechnology
companies operating in the United States and market capitalization for the U.S. biotechnology industry
had reached $97 billion. Biotechnology Industry Organization: Editors' & Reporters' Guide to
Biotechnology (Feb. 2000), available at http://www.bio.org/ aboutbio/guide2000/facts.html
[hereinafter Guide to Biotechnology]. The total amount of external financing raised annually by new
U.S. biotechnology firms (including financing from venture capital, initial public offerings, follow-on
offerings, private placements, debt and convertible security issues, and issuance of shares in research
and development financing organizations) increased from $248 million in 1980 to approximately $3.1
billion in 1995 (amounts computed in 1995 dollars); the high year was 1990, when approximately $5.4
billion was raised. Josh Lerner & Robert P. Merges, The Control of Technology Alliances: An
Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 125, 128 (1998). The National
Venture Capital Association reports that U.S. biotechnology firms received $1.18 billion in venture
capital funding in 1999. Martin Van Der Werf, Universities Could Benefitfrom Venture Capitalists'
Renewed Interest in Biotechnology, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., (Feb. 28, 2000), at
http:l/chronicle.comldaily/2000/02/2000022802n.htm. This figure represents an increase from the 1998
funding level of $1.03 billion. Id.
24. Guide to Biotechnology, supra note 23(providing graphical representation of total numbers of
U.S. biotechnology patents granted per year, shows that biotechnology patenting has escalated from
less than 2000 patents issuing in 1985 to more than 9000 patents issuing in 1998); Report of the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) Working Group on Research Tools 3, at
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm (June 4, 1998) [hereinafter NIH Research Tools
Report] (reporting "increasing use of the patent system to obtain proprietary rights in research tools and
increasing use of license agreements and material transfer agreements (MTAs) delineating the terms
and conditions under which research tools can be used').
25. See generally Karen Hall, Genomic Warfare, AM. LAW., June 2000, at 68. "Genomics" refers to
that subset of the biotechnology industry which is engaged in finding, sequencing, and frequently
patenting purified and isolated sequences of genes. Many of the genomics firms have piggybacked on
the work of the Human Genome Project, a federal government effort to identify all genes in the human
body. As of September 1999, reportedly 1800 U.S. patents had issued on animal, plant, and human
genes, and 7000 other genes were the subject of pending U.S. patent applications. Should Congress
Liberate Gene Data?, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 16, 1999, at A26 [hereinafter Gene Data]. In January 2000,
more than seventy genomics companies were poised to issue public stock offerings. Another Boom in
Biotechnology Stocks: Genetic Research Lures Internet Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2000, at B9.
26. See, e.g., Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on
Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090,
72,090 (Dec. 23, 1999) [hereinafter NIH Principles and Guidelines] (reporting formation of advisory
committee to Director of NIH, Dr. Harold Varmus, to "look into problems encountered in the
dissemination and use of proprietary research tools, the competing interests of intellectual property
owners and research users underlying these problems, and possible NIH responses'); Irving N. Feit,
Biotechnology Research and the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 71 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 819, 821 (1989) (predicting that "[als commercial products [of
biotechnology] become available, the infringement of patents covering the basic research methods that
led to the product will become an increasingly difficult problem'); Lita Nelsen, The Rise oflntellectual
Property Protection in the American University, 279 SCIENCE 1460, 1460-61 (1998) (listing
"[r]estricted availability or delays in exchange of 'research tools' (such as vectors or transgenic mice)
in biological research" as one of several unresolved problems currently facing university technology-
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require ever-greater numbers of proprietary tools,27 giving rise to
transaction costs associated with acquiring the right to use each such tool.
In some cases, the patentee may refuse to license the research tool
altogether. The sum total of the transaction costs involved with acquisition
of all necessary research tools may be so severe as to impede, postpone, or
stop the development of important new products.
Within the highly patent-centric environment of biotechnological and
biomedical research and development, Michael Heller and Rebecca
Eisenberg have argued that the scientific community is approaching a
"tragedy of the anti-commons." '28 The anti-commons theory predicts that
the proliferation of patents on "upstream" basic tools of biotechnological
and biomedical research will stymie the development of sufficient numbers
of downstream application products. Innovation is impeded by the "royalty
stacking" problem imposed by the numerous upstream patents that must be
practiced in order to make the new downstream product.29 The problem of
too many restrictions on upstream research tools resulting in an
impoverishment of downstream products is the reverse of the famous
"tragedy of the commons" theorized by Garrett Hardin in 1968.30 In
Hardin's metaphor, the absence of restrictions on access to public lands
resulted in a tragedy of over-grazing; here the result is under-development
of potentially important commercial drugs and therapeutic products.
The anti-commons theory is far from a merely academic construct. The
National Institutes of Health (NIH) Working Group on Research Tools
found in 1998 that "all segments" of the biotechnology research and
development community surveyed agreed that "the stacking of intellectual
property obligations as successive tools are used in the course of an
extended research project has the potential to impede or even preclude the
development of new and better diagnostic and therapeutic products."' The
transfer management); Gene Data, supra note 25 ("Holders ofgenetic patents have been charging steep
licensing fees for use of their information and sending 'cease and desist' notices to competing
companies, academic medical centers and clinical laboratories that use it without permission.").
27. Kyla Dunn, A Look at... Patents & Biotech, WASH. POST, Oct 1, 2000, at B3 (reporting that
"[t]he cost of doing [biotechnology] research now includes the cost of accessing these [research tool]
patents-at whatever price the market will bear").
28. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).
29. Id. at 699.
30. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243-48.
31. NIH Research Tools Report, supra note 24, at 22; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology
Transfer and the Genome Project: Problems With Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK 163, 168 (1994)
(asserting that patents on research tools "can create obstacles to subsequent [reasearch and
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patenting of numerous "knockout" (gene-deleted) laboratory mice in recent
years has incensed scientists concerned about the high prices and
burdensome licensing conditions associated with these research tools.3"
University licensing directors list "[r]estricted availability or delays in
exchange of 'research tools' (such as vectors or transgenic mice) in
biological research" as a key, unresolved challenge.33 Scientists using
"DNA chip" technology to screen patients for genetic variations envision a
nightmare scenario in which a license is required for each of the thousands
of DNA sequences attached to a thumbnail-sized chip.34 In the plant
biotechnology sector, technology-transfer officials report stifled
development because of the veto power wielded by the owners of patents
on research tools such as promoters and transformation systems that are
necessary for the commercial development of transgenic plants.35 In an
attempt to overturn what they view as overly restrictive licensing terms and
excessive licensing fees, the families of children afflicted with Canavan
disease, a rare genetic disorder of the brain, are suing the research scientists
who isolated and patented the gene responsible for the illness.36
development] and add to a thicket of rights that firms must negotiate their way past before they can get
their products on the market"); Gene Data, supra note 25, at A26 (reporting that "[r]ather than risk a
lawsuit or pay fees they consider exorbitant, some researchers have stopped exploring diseases whose
genetic profiles already have been licensed").
Specific types of obstacles to access that the NIH Working Group investigated included "refusals to
license, onerous royalty obligations, restrictions on the dissemination of materials and information,
restrictions on the ability to collaborate with commercial firms, and advance commitments regarding
intellectual property rights in future discoveries." NIH Research Tools Report, supra note 24, at 4.
32. Eliot Marshall,A Deluge ofPatents Creates Legal Hasslesfor Research, 288 SCIENCE 255,255-
57 (2000). Marshall reports that "[t]his tension between the creators and the controllers of knockout
mice is indicative of a tension throughout the research world." Ido at 255.
33. Nelsen,supra note 26, at 1460-61 (Ms. Nelsen is director of the Technology Licensing Office of
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology); see also Richard Florida, The Role of the University:
Leveraging Talent, Not Technology, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Summer 1999, at 69-70 (noting concerns of
smaller industrial firms that partner with universities over "protracted negotiations by university
technology-transfer offices or attorneys over intellectual property rights," which impede goal of getting
new innovations to market as quickly as possible).
34. Robert F. Service, Will Patent Fights Hold DNA Chips Hostage?, 282 SCIENCE 396,397 (1998).
35. Colm Lawler & Fred Erbisch, From Mice to Maize, 283 SCIENCE 33, 33 (1999).
36. Peter Gorner, Parents Suing Over Patenting of Genetic Test, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19,2000, at 1. On
October 30, 2000, the parents of children suffering from Canavan disease, along with the New York-
based Canavan Foundation and other foundations, sued Dr. Reuben Matalon and his institution, Miami
Children's Hospital, in federal district court in Chicago seeking to block the hospital's commercial use
of the Canavan gene and recover money damages based on royalties that the hospital has collected
from licensing a patented test that screens for the Canavan gene. Id. at 9. The Canavan Foundation
alleges that it was forced to stop offering free genetic screening after learning that it would have to pay
royalties and comply with licensing terms it considered onerous. Id.
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This dilemma of gaining access to patented research tools needed in
biotechnological and biomedical development suggests the importance of
re-conceptualizing the experimental use doctrine as a partial, if not
complete, solution.37 This Article argues that where significant transaction
costs are associated with accessing the patented research tools necessary to
develop downstream application products such as new drugs, therapies, and
diagnostics, the non-consensual use of those tools, even though for
ultimately commercial purposes, should no longer be automatically
disqualified from the benefits of the experimental use doctrine. This Article
further proposes a "liability rule'38 model that, while prohibiting the patent
owner from enjoining the non-consensual use of the research tool, would
appropriately compensate the patent owner in the form of an ex post
The lawsuit does not attack the validity of the Canavan gene patent, but instead seeks damages and
equitable and injunctive relief to redress the defendants' alleged breach of informed consent, breach of
fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, fraudulent concealment, conversion, and misappropriation oftrade
secrets. Complaint at 1, Daniel Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 30, 2000) (No. OOC 6779) (copy on file with author). The plaintiffs allege that, as owner of the
Canavan gene patent, Miami Children's Hospital "substantially restricted the number of laboratories
authorized to conduct Canavan disease testing through exclusive licensing agreements" and "restricted
public accessibility to testing through 'volume caps' that limited the number of tests to be performed
by licensed laboratories and by requiring all such laboratories to pay royalty and licensing fees."Id. at
10. Among other remedies, the plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction restraining the hospital "from
restricting access to prenatal and carrier testing for Canavan disease through exclusive licensing and/or
collection of royalties, and from impeding research on finding a cure or therapies for Canavan disease
through enforcement of Patent No. 5,679,635 or related international patents, or pursuit of pending
international patents." Id. at 13.
37. See NIH Research Tools Report, supra note 24, at 23 n.5 (proposing "clarification of the
research exemption" as one of several issues for further consideration).
A number of academic commentators have suggested a larger role for the experimental use
exemption, or at least the importance of a clearer understanding of the doctrine's scope. See Barton,
supra note 15, at 457 (proposing revision of experimental use exemption "so as clearly to permit use of
patented technology for technology improvement purposes without needing to obtain an explicit
license"); Jon Cohen, Chiron Stakes out Its Territory, 285 SCIENCE, 28 (1999) (quoting Robert
Merges's description of experimental use exemption's reach as "one of the great unsolved mysteries of
contemporary patent metaphysics"); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHl. L. REv. 1017,1020 (1989) (asserting that purpose
and scope ofexperimental use defense "are not well defined" and that "this vaguely defined doctrine is
becoming less satisfactory" as level of research utilizing patented materials continues to accelerate);
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics ofPatent Scope, 90 CoLuM. L.
REV. 839, 866 n.1 18 (1990) (characterizing "precise contours" of experimental use defense as
"unclear"); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms
ofScience, 94 NW. U. L. REv. 77, 139 (1999) (suggesting broader interpretation of experimental use
exception as one possible mechanism for reducing transaction and creativity costs associated with
patenting basic scientific research).
38. "Liability rules" and "property rules" are defined infra note 278.
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royalty based on the marketplace value of any new products developed
through use of the tool; in other words, a "reach-through" royalty approach.
Part II provides a further definition of the nature of research tools and
the increasingly problematic restrictions on access to the tools. Part III
addresses the traditional narrow interpretation of the experimental use
doctrine by the U.S. courts. Part IV discusses the implications of that
interpretation for university-industry research and development
collaborations. Part V examines the more liberal treatment of the
experimental use doctrine in Europe and Japan. Part VI responds to
arguments commonly cited against the experimental use exemption and
suggests additional justifications for its broadening in the context of
research tools. In Part VII, this Article proposes an expanded model of the
experimental use doctrine that would permit the non-consensual
"development use" of research tools, coupled with an ex post royalty
payment based on the marketplace-determined value of the new products
that result from that use. It concludes that the present "truly narrow"
formulation of the experimental use doctrine in the United States is
inapplicable to most research tool users, and the doctrine should be
expanded in a manner that will maximize the development of important
new therapeutic products while maintaining appropriate investment
incentives for the ongoing creation of new research tools.
II. DEFINING AND ACCESSING "RESEARCH TOOLS"
The debate over patenting research tools begins with defining what
research tools truly are. This Part surveys candidate meanings and provides
examples of prominent research tools that have been subject to proprietary
constraints. It contends that restrictions on access to such research tools are
currently most problematic in the field of biotechnological research and
development, and describes the types of escalating transaction costs faced
by these enterprises.
"Research tools" is a phrase of many meanings depending on
perspective. While researchers view the resources they rely on in the
laboratory as "tools," firms whose primary business is to manufacture and
sell these resources may consider the same "tools" as "end products. 3 9 A
clear definition of "research tools" is an essential prerequisite to any
39. NIH Research Tools Report, supra note 24, at 3.
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proposal for modification of the patent owners' right to prohibit non-
consensual uses of the tools.4"
The NIH Working Group on Research Tools (Working Group) was
formed in 199741 to investigate the problems of NIH grantees in obtaining
access to patented research resources.42 The Working Group report defines
"research tool" in its broadest sense as "embrac[ing] the full range of
resources that scientists use in the laboratory,"43 including "cell lines,
monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth factors,
combinatorial chemistry libraries, drugs and drug targets, clones and
cloning tools (such as PCR [polymerase chain reaction]), methods,
laboratory equipment and machines, databases and computer software."
The problem of access to patented research tools is currently more acute
and better documented in biotechnology than in any other scientific field.45
Biotechnology is research-intensive.46 A high percentage 'of the basic
research tools and laboratory techniques of biotechnology are subject to
proprietary restraints such as patents47 or material transfer agreements.48
40. Evelyn H. McConathy& Clifford K. Weber, Committee Report: University and Government 1P
Issues, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N BULL., Mid-Winter 2000, at 178 (identifying "gray areas" in
definition of research tools that impact determination of how their use"can, or should be, protected").
41. Eliot Marshall, Making Research Tools MoreAccessible, 280 SCIENCE 1687 (1998).
42- NIH Research Tools Report, supra note 24, at 4.
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id.; see also James G. Cullem, Panning for Biotechnology Gold: Reach-Through Royalty
Damage Awards for Infringing Uses of Patented Molecular Sieves, 39 IDEA 553, 553 (1999)
(describing "molecular sieves" as next-generation research tools used to "screen for, and identify,
novel, specific compounds for known molecular targets").
45. In contrast with the field ofbiotechnology, restrictions on proprietary research tools have not yet
been reported as problematic in the development of Internet- and computer-implemented business
methods and products. As patenting activity in these technologies continues to increase at an explosive
pace, however, access to developmental tools may become an issue. For example, the developer of a
new software program might need access to various patented algorithms in order to test the
performance of a new program. Ofcourse, developers who use "tools" that would qualify as "methods"
under the new Prior Inventor Defense provisions of the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999
(codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 273 (West Supp. 1999)) may be able to assert that defense without needing
to rely on an experimental use doctrine as proposed in this Article.
46. The Biotechnology Industry Organization, a trade group for the biotechnology industry, reports
that the U.S. biotechnology industry's expenditure for research and development was $9.9 billion in
1998. Guide to Biotechnology, supra note 23.
47. See Feit, supra note 26, at 819 (contending that experimental use exception "is likely to have a
particularly important impact on biotechnology, where basic laboratory methods and materials
constitute the subject matter of patent claims").
48. A material transfer agreement (MTA) is a negotiated contract between the owner of a tangible
material, either patented or unpatented, and a party who seeks the material for research use. See NIH
Research Tools Report, supra note 24, at App. B. MTA's tend to be less formal and shorter than patent
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proprietary restraints such as patents 47 or material transfer agreements. 48
Proponents of patent protection contend that the high cost of developing
these tools can be recouped only through temporary, sole-source pricing
control.49 Moreover, because of the scientific complexity of their work,
biotechnology researchers generally need access to a relatively greater
number of proprietary research tools in order to conduct their research than
do workers in other technologies."
Some of the most important research tools in biotechnology, all subject
to proprietary restraints, include:
o The cre-loxP mouse. E.I. du Pont de Nemours owns the
patented technology5 used to create "conditional mutants,"
mice in whom a targeted gene is deleted when the cre gene
encounters two loxP DNA segments bracketing the targeted
gene.52
o The Cohen-Boyer patents covering the basic method and
plasmids for gene cloning, assigned to the University of
47. See Feit, supra note 26, at 819 (contending that experimental use exception "is likely to have a
particularly important impact on biotechnology, where basic laboratory methods and materials
constitute the subject matter of patent claims").
48. A material transfer agreement (MTA) is a negotiated contract between the owner of a tangible
material, either patented or unpatented, and a party who seeks the material for research use. See NIH
Research Tools Report, supra note 24, at App. B. MTA's tend to be less formal and shorter than patent
license agreements, and generally do not require financial payments at the time of the material transfer.
Id. The NIH and academic community have developed a standardized MTA for transfers ofbiological
materials known as the "Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement" (UBMTA). Id.
49. Scott A. Chambers, Comments on the Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with the
Identification ofPartial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA QJ. 53, 54 (1995); Maurice A. Flores, Taking the
Profits out ofBiomedical Research Tools, 17 NATuRE BIOTECHNOLoGY 819, 820 (1999).
50. For example, DNA-chip technology involves layering chains of nucleotides onto silicon. See
Sandeep Junnarkar, 'GeneChip' Encodes DNA on Silicon, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 1997), at
http://search I .nytimes.comsearch/daily/bin/fastweb?getdo+site+site+-126360+2+wAAA+genechip.
These thumbnail-size chips offer a myriad of potential applications in diagnosing genetic mutations
and studying genes believed to be responsible for various types of cancer. Id. More than 40,000 gene
sequences may be attached to a single 2.5-centimeter chip. Service, supra note 34, at 397. If each of
those sequences is covered by a patent, a nightmarish licensing scenario may ensue. Id.
51. U.S. Patent No. 4,959,317 (issued Sept. 25, 1990) ("Site-Specific Recombination of DNA in
Eukaryotic Cells").
52. Eliot Marshall, The Mouse that Prompted a Roar, 277 SCIENCE 24 (1997). Research institutions
including the NIH protested when DuPont required academic researchers to sign no-cost "research
licenses." Id. at 25. Some commercial institutions have taken licenses for more than S 100,000. See id.
The science press has characterized the restrictions on cre-loxP as "a lightning rod for scientists
chafing at restrictions on the free flow of research materials," id. at 24, and the National Academy of
Sciences has cited the restrictions as a "commercial barrier[] to basic research," id. at 25.
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widely licensed' and are often cited as a positive example of
the benefits of patenting research tools.
55
" PCR (polymerase chain reaction) technology. 6  Cetus
Corporation originally owned the patents on PCR, a basic
method of amplifying DNA sequences and the key reagent used
in PCR, the enzyme Taq DNA polymerase5 7
" The Harvard "oncomouse" patent of Leder-Stewart, assigned to
Harvard University and exclusively licensed to E.I. du Pont de
Nemours.5 8 The tumor-prone "oncomouse" is useful as a model
in cancer research.
59
* The expressed sequence tags (ESTs)f that have been identified
in the decoding of the human genome. Many of these small
54. The Cohen-Boyerpatents have been "licensed to all comers." Merges& Nelson, supra note 37,
at 906. There are reportedly more than seventy licensees of the Cohen-Boyer patents. See Feit, supra
note 26, at 820 (reporting that Cohen-Boyer patent license "provides for a minimum royalty of$ 10,000
per year and royalties based on net sales of final products at arate of 0.5% to 10% based on the type of
final product and country of sale").
55. E.g., Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, IntellectualProperty Rights in Genes and Gene
Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequences, 85 IowA L. REv. 735, 803 (2000);
Rochelle K. Seide & Janet M. McLeod, Response to Policy Commentary, SCIENCE (contending that
Cohen-Boyer patents did not stymie technology because broadly licensed at reasonable rates),
available at http:lwww.sciencemag.orgfeatureldata980465/seide.shl (last visited Oct. 23, 2000).
56. The PCR process selectively and exponentially amplifies (or multiplies) a specific region of
DNA, producing quantities of DNA sufficient for experimentation and analysis. DRLiCA,supra note 6,
at 153-57, 314. The invention of PCR is detailed in RABINOW, supra note 1.
57. Eliot Marshall,Battling OverBasics, 277 SCIENCE 25 (1997). Cetus's efforts to impose licenses
on academic researchers using PCR were widely criticized. E.g., Barinaga, supra note 7, at 1273.
Roche acquired the patent rights from Cetus in 1991 for $300 million. Service, supra note 5, at 2251.
Since that time, it has imposed a multi-tiered licensing system. Marshall, supra note 57, at 25. Roche's
patent on the "native" form of the Taq enzyme (i.e., purified from the bacterium Thermus aquaticus)
was recently held unenforceable by a federal district court as having been procured through inequitable
conduct. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., No. C-93-1748 VRW, 1999 WL 1797330 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 7,1999) (holdingall claims of U.S. PatentNo. 4,889,818 unenforceable); Service,supra note
5, at 2251. The ruling, now on appeal, was limited to n-Taq and did not directly effect Roche's other
patents on a recombinant form of Taq and on the PCR process. Id. at 2253.
58. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988) ('Transgenic Non-Human Mammals").
59. In 1988, DuPont was selling the genetically modified mice to cancer researchers for
approximately $50 each. See Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 1084.
60. An EST is a short fragment of complimentary DNA (eDNA), typically 150-400 base pairs in
length, that is potentially useful as a probe to find the corresponding full-length gene. Rebecca S.
Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter As To the Patentability of Certain Inventions
Associated With the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA QJ. 1, 2, 13-14 (1995).
Complimentary DNA is DNA synthesized in test tubes from ribonucleic acid (RNA). DRLIcA, supra
note 6, at 305.
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segments of complimentary DNA have no presently known
utility, although they are believed to be useful as probes in
searching for corresponding full-length genes.6'
0 Human embryonic stem cells, from which any type of human
tissue can be grown.62 Stem cell research may someday permit
doctors to grow transplant organs that identically match a
patient's tissue.63 The Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
(WARF) owns a broad patent on these cells' and has granted an
exclusive license to Geron Corporation for commercial use.65
This Article limits the analysis of "research tools" to those patented tools
used in development of new biotechnological or pharmaceutical products
that do not themselves physically incorporate the tool. Thus defined, the
sale of such products would not trigger the "sells" or "offers to sell"
61. Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 60, at 13-14. Whether ESTs are properly characterized as
"research tools" requires that a distinction be made between ESTs themselves and patents on ESTs. An
EST itself, i.e., the short segment of complimentary DNA, is a research tool in the sense that it is used
as a tool to find a corresponding fuIll-length gene. Public comments received by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) in response to its first round of Interim Written Description Guidelines,
published in June 1998, reflect this view. Commentators asserted that "ESTs are genomic research
tools that should be available for unencumbered research to advance the public good." Department of
Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, Revised Utility Examination Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg.
71,440, 71,441 (Dec. 21, 1999) [hereinafter Examination Guidelines].
"Research tool" may not be a proper characterization for the many patents and pending patent
applications directed to ESTs. Many in the biotechnology industry are concerned about EST patent
claims of"open" scope (i.e., those reciting a purified and isolated "DNA comprising the sequence [EST
nucleotide sequence data]"). Janice M. Mueller, Patent Law Examination Guidelines, NAT. L.J., Jan.
24, 2000, at B7; Rai, supra note 37, at 104 (stating that many pending EST patent applications claim
"not only the EST but also the full gene of which it is a part and future uses of the gene"). Such claims
appear to read on the full-length gene (as yet unknown), which could include within it the recited EST
sequence plus a multitude of other sequences or regulatory elements. Thus, the EST sequence recited in
the "comprising" claim would not be merely a tool, but actually a physical subset of the full-length
gene once located. This is a very different paradigm from the use of the cre-loxP mouse to develop a
new drug, where the mouse "tool" is used to make a new product but is not part of or incorporated into
that product. See Robert Blackburn, Chief Patent Counsel, Chiron Corporation, remarks at the National
Academies Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy's Conference on "Intellectual
Property Rights: How Far Should They Be Extended?" (Washington, D.C., Feb. 3,2000) (contending
that ESTs are not true "research tools" because they have no clear utility other than as part of final
product).
62. Dunn, supra note 27, at B3.
63. Id.
64. U.S. Patent No. 5,843,780 (issued Dec. 1, 1998) ("Primate Embryonic Stem Cells').
65. Dunn, supra note 27, at B3 (reporting that although WARF is permitting scientists to access
patented stem cells for "purely academic research," researchers and patent experts are concerned that
Geron's right to exclude others from commercial use of cells "may determine whether or not new
lifesaving therapies reach the public').
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liability provisions of the Patent Act.66 Rather, the liability for infringement
of patents on these research tools, absent a license or exemption, would
occur only under the "uses" (and in some cases, the "makes" 6 ) provisions
of the statute.
Another important qualifier on the meaning of "research tools" as used
herein is that the analysis is limited to those patented tools for which access
is problematic. The patenting of a particular research tool does not
necessarily create dissemination problems for that tool. Likewise, any
resulting impediment to innovation of products requiring use of the tool is
not uniformly high for all types of tools. Economically rational researchers
would not risk infringement liability when they can simply buy widely
available tools such as patented chemical reagents or genetically modified
laboratory mice via supplier catalog or other anonymous market
transactions.6 ' Transaction costs and access barriers would not be at issue
here, and a broadened research exemption would not be necessary in such
cases.
69
In contrast, the possibility that research will be delayed or foregone, or
that it will be conducted without authorization to use the patented research
tool and lead to subsequent litigation, is much greater where the research
tool must be acquired through direct license negotiations."° Researchers
may balk at the prospect of having to disclose the nature of their research in
the course of obtaining the licenses they need." Alternatively, the suppliers
of patented research tools may simply refuse to license them,' or place
66. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (Supp. IV 1998) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes
the patent'); see also supra notes 13-14.
67. The "making" liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) would involve the construction or synthesis of
the research tool as a precursor to its use in developing a new product that does not incorporate the
tool. For example, a cre-loxP mouse might be made (rather than purchased from an external source) by
the research worker before it was used, but the ultimate sale of a new therapeutic product developed by
using the patented mouse would not involve a sale of the mouse itself.
68. Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 171.
69. Cf Barton,supra note 15, at 457 (advocating broadened experimental use exemption for follow-
on innovators, "unless, of course, the technology is readily available, as through a research kit").
70. Id.;seegenerallyMarkA. Lemley, The Economics oflmprovementinlntellectualPropertyLaw,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1053-55 (1997) (describing various transaction costs involved in licensing
intellectual property and concluding that these costs are "significant").
71. Barton, supra note 15, at 457.
72 Refusal to license a patent, even where the patent owner has market power in the antitrust law
sense, has not been held to violate the antitrust laws. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d
1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (1994). Section 271(d)(4) provides:
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significant limitations on licenses, such as refusing to grant non-exclusive
licenses to multiple researchers.73
Even where research tool patent owners are amenable to licensing, the
price demanded can represent a barrier to entry. When there is not yet any
commercial product in existence, the research-tool patent owner and the
tool user may have very different views about the proper economic
valuation of the tool.74 With increasing frequency, research tool patentees
are demanding the payment of "reach-through royalties."' Such royalties
are computed as a share of the ultimate market value of some future
commercial product to be developed with the tool, rather than the current
market value of the research tool itself.76 Although reach-through royalties
are often attractive to biotech start-up firms because they minimize or
eliminate up-front licensing costs, other potential licensees may object to
them.77 The NIH have recently issued a strongly-worded criticism of reach-
through royalties, at least for tools licensed by or to NIH grantees.
78
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a
patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension ofthe patent right by
reason of his having done one or more ofthe following: ... (4) refused to license or use any rights
to the patent.
Id.
73. Nelsen, supra note 26, at 1460-61 (criticizingexclusive licensingofreceptor"targets" forhigh-
throughput drug screening in situations where non-exclusive licensing "might better foster
development").
74. Flores, supra note 49, at 819 (contending that often "the promise of generating commercial
value is remote and the up-front use fee that scientists are willing to pay without extended negotiation
is correspondingly low"); cf Josh Lerner & Robert P. Merges, The Control of Technology Alliances:
An EmpiricalAnalysis ofthe Biotechnology Industry, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 125, 126 (1998) (describing
early-stage biotechnology research and development efforts as "highly complex and uncertain" and
characterized by great difficulty in "specify[ing] the features of the product to be developed').
75. John H. Barton, Economics of Patent Enforcement, 532 PLI/PAT. 343, 350 (1998).
76. For example, assume that Firm X is the supplier ofa transgenic mouse useful in pharmaceutical
research. Firm Y wants to use the mouse in laboratory testing in order to develop a new drug. By
demanding a reach-through royalty, Firm X seeks to obtain from Firm Y some portion of future
revenues from marketplace sales of the end product, the new drug. See Jorge A. Goldstein, Research
Tools and Reach Throughs, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH ANNUAL AMERICAN TYPE CULTURE
COLLECTION BIOTECH PATENT & LICENSING FORUM (Sept. 23-26, 1999); see also Barton, supra note
75 (noting patenting of research tools by biotechnology entities and universities and efforts of these
firms to obtain reach-through royalty provisions in licenses); Cohen, supra note 37, at 28 (reporting
attempts ofChiron Corporation, owner of patents on hepatitis C viral protease enzyme, to obtain reach-
through royalties based on future sales of protease inhibitors developed by firms that use Chiron's
enzyme to screen for these inhibitors).
77. Basing royalties on sales of a possible future end-product rather than the patented research tool
itself creates the potential for greatly enhanced royalty income to the patentee, particularly if the
licensee develops a product that is successful in the marketplace. Some scholars contend that this
reach-through mechanism works to reduce the licensee's incentives to innovate and develop
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These difficulties in defining and accessing research tools suggest the
need for an experimental use doctrine that would, if not completely exempt
research and development uses of patented tools from infringement
liability, at least permit the use of patented research tools without prior
consent, so long as appropriate compensation were subsequently paid to the
research tool patent owner.79 As illustrated in the next Part, however, the
current formulation of the experimental use doctrine in the United States is
far too narrow to permit such activity and must therefore be expanded.
III. LIMITED RECOGNITION OF A "TRULY NARROW"
EXPERIMENTAL USE DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES
For almost 200 years U.S. patent jurisprudence has paid homage to the
concept of an exception (or exemption80) from infringement liability for
unlicensed or otherwise unauthorized uses of patented inventions carried
out for a research or experimental81 purpose.82 In practice, however, the
experimental use doctrine has rarely been applied in favor of an accused
commercially successful products. E.g., Barton, supra note 15, at 461 (asserting that reach-through
royalties "directly reduce the follow-on inventor's incentive to develop new technologies"). On the
other hand, reach-through royalties may facilitate increased research and development activity because
they allow authorized access to a research tool at little or no up-front cost.
78. NIH Principles and Guidelines, supra note 26, at 72,091 (finding that reach-through royalties
"contribute not only to specific restriction of access to subsequent tools arising out ofthe NIH-funded
work, but also to the general proliferation of multiple ties and competing interests that is the source of
the current access problems"); Barton, supra note 75, at 350 (noting opposition of pharmaceutical
firms to reach-through royalties). Patent bar groups have also identified concerns with demands for
reach-through royalties in consensual licensing transactions of research tools. McConathy & Weber,
supra note 40, at 178 (noting that reach-through license 'increases the royalty burden, requires full
disclosure of the licensee's intended use of the technology, and may so enlarge the stacking provisions
that the entire project is killed"). But see Flores, supra note 49, at 819-20 (criticizing NIH Proposed
Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating
Biomedical Research Resources; Request for Comments, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,205 (May 25, 1999), as
overly broad in attempting to prohibit reach-through royalties in licenses to commercial entities as well
as to academics). The propriety of reach-through royalties is further addressed infra notes 286-305 and
accompanying text.
79. Part VII infra details this proposed liability rule.
80. Although the U.S. case law has generally referred to an experimental use "exception," the term
"exemption" is more precise and will be used herein.
81. The terms "research use" and "experimental use" appear interchangeably in U.S. case law and
literature that recognizes an exemption from infringement liability.
82. See generally 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03 [1] (2000).
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infringer.83 Although Congress enacted legislation in 1984 that created a
safe harbor for generic drug manufacturers to test patented drugs for
purposes of preparing FDA bioequivalency data," that narrow and specific
statutory safe harbor is not the subject of this Article. Rather this Part
focuses on what remains of the common law doctrine of experimental use85
and suggests that the burgeoning nonprofit and for-profit collaborative
environment of biotechnology research and development calls for a
fundamental rethinking of this doctrine's very limited contours.
In the great majority of cases, U.S. courts have recognized the
experimental use exemption as doctrinally legitimate but found it
inapplicable to the facts of the particular cases before them. The accused
infringer's use of a patented invention, even for a socially-beneficial
purpose such as scientific research, typically has been labeled a commercial
or profit-making endeavor and, therefore, ineligible for the doctrine'sprotections.8 The courts have considered even a minimal flavor of
commerciality sufficient to take the accused activity outside the realm of
protected experimental or research use.87
83. E.g., Douglas v. United States, 181 U.S.P.Q. 170, 176 (Ct. Cl. Tr. Div. 1974) (characterizing
experimental use defense as "only sparingly applied" in U.S. patent case law), afIdon othergrounds,
184 U.S.P.Q. 613 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
84. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,98 Stat.
1585 (1984) (Hatch-Waxman Act) (codified in pertinent part at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1994)).
85. Although the U.S. Patent Act includes among the enumerated defenses to patent infringement
the "absence of liability for infringement," 35 U.S.C. § 282(1), no court has pointed to that statutory
provision as encompassing the experimental use doctrine. E.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Int'l Rectifier Corp., 217
U.S.P.Q. 157, 160 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("There is nothing in the Patent Act of 1952 which even mentions
any experimental use exception. The experimental use exception is... purely case law."). The
commentary by a co-author of the 1952 codification of the Act does not mention the experimental use
doctrine. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1 (1954 ed.) reprinted in 75
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 161,215 (1993) (stating that item one of§ 282 "would include the
defenses such as that the patented invention has not been made, used or sold by the defendant; license;
and equitable defenses such as laches, estoppel and unclean hands'). Thus, the general experimental
use doctrine, as opposed to the explicit regulatory data-gathering safe harbor of 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e), is
onc of common law rather than statute.
86. CHISUM, supra note 82, § 16.03[l] (characterizing defense as limited to those acts conducted
"solely for an experimental or other nonprofit purpose").
87. See, e.g., Pfizer, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 161 ("The underlying rule of permissible experimental use
demands there must be no intended commercial use of the patented article, none whatsoever, if the
exception is to be recognized at all.').
That almost all of the reported cases invoking the experimental use defense involved some degree of
commercialization is not surprising because litigation costs will most likely deter enforcement where a
defendant's use is merely for amusement or philosophical inquiry, not involving some significant sales
diversion or other profit-taking from the patentee. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Beedle v.
Bennett, 122 U.S. 71 (1887), is a rare exception to this general rule. The plaintiff in Beedle held a
patent on a driven well for drawing water from the ground. Id. at 72. The defendant, without
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A. United States Common Law Evolution of a "Truly Narrow"
Experimental Use Exemption
1. Early Development: Commercial Intent Prohibited
The experimental use exemption from patent infringement liability
originated in the opinions of Justice Joseph Story, one of the country's
early leading intellectual property jurists.88 Justice Story's first and most
commonly cited case on the subject is Whittemore v. Cutter,89 involving an
alleged infringement of a patent directed to a machine for making cards. In
discussing the trial court's instruction on infringement to the jury, Justice
Story opined that:
It could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a
man, who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical
experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the
machine to produce its described effects."°
In Sawin v. Guild,9 Justice Story cited his earlier decision in Whittemore
as establishing that patent infringement must concern:
the making [of the invention] with an intent to use for profit, and not
for the mere purpose of philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the
authorization, constructed the patented well on his farm for his personal use and that of his family
members, but never sold the infringing well to others. Id. at 73. The plaintiff' s total damages from the
defendant's use over the lifetime of the well were calculated at ten dollars. Id. at 75. The U.S. Supreme
Court found in favor of the plaintiff without mention of any exception to liability for mere personal
amusement or for merely de minimus use. See id. at 78. Beedle makes clear that no sale need occur for
patent infringement liability; mere use is enough.
88. Indeed, Justice Story was an early interdisciplinarian in his thinking about intellectual property
law. Some years after he recognized an experimental use exemption from patent infringement in
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600), Justice Story authored the
seminal U.S. decision recognizing the fair use defense in copyright law, Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). Codified in the 1976 Copyright Act, the fair use doctrine
provides that certain socially beneficial uses of copyrighted works such as scholarly criticism,
classroom use, news reporting, and the like are not copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
The U.S. courts' reticence to embrace a meaningful experimental-research use exemption in the patent
law context stands in sharp contrast to the well-developed fair use jurisprudence in copyright law. Part
VI infra discusses the applicability of the fair use "transformative use" notion to the patent law
experimental use doctrine
89. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
90. Id. at 1121. In reality, this frequently quoted language was Justice Story's explanation of the
rationale for the jury charge given by the trial court. While Justice Story appears to approve the
rationale, his explanation is dicta because the patentee was granted a new trial for several unrelated
errors by the trial court.
91. 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
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verity and exactness of the specification .... In other words, that the
making must be with an intent to infringe the patent-right, and
deprive the owner of the lawful rewards of his discovery.
92
In Sawin, Justice Story thus makes the accused inftinger's commercial
intent the hallmark of liability, and the absence of such motive as the
prerequisite for exemption under the experimental use doctrine. 93 Justice
Story's dichotomy was adopted in subsequent decisions,94 and it remains
the rule today. 95
Several explanations have been posited for Justice Story's profit-
dispositive view. Suits for patent infringement were brought in Justice
Story's era as actions for trespass on the case, a tort theory requiring a
showing of wrongful intent or negligence. 96 Justice Story simply may have
recognized the absence of such intent. Alternatively, Justice Story may
have relied on the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex ("the law takes no
account of trifles"). 97 One commentator suggests that Justice Story was
merely invoking the common law principle of injuria absque damno
(wrong without damage),98 which applies when a party's rights have been
violated but the party has not suffered any legally recognizable damage.
This explanation seems unlikely, however, in view of Justice Story's
statement in Whittemore that "where the law gives an action for a particular
act, the doing of that act imports of itself a damage to the party. Every
violation of a right imports some damage, and if none other be proved, the
law allows a nominal damage. ' 99
Professor William Robinson in his famous 1890 treatise seconded
Justice Story's "intent to deprive the patentee of his rewards" theory, titling
92. Id. at 555.
93. It is unclear whether Justice Story would view an infringement that is unknowing or "innocent"
(i.e., where the accused infringer was not aware of the plaintiff's patent) as equally disqualified from
any experimental use exemption as a willful infringement, so long as in either case the accused
infringer intended to make a profit.
94. E.g., Byam v. Ballard, 4 F. Cas. 934, 934 (C.C.D. Mass. 1852) (No. 2,262).
95. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Roche Prods., Inc. v.
Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
96. Richard E. Bee, Experimental Use as an Act ofPatentInfringement, 39 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 357,
364-65 (1957).
97. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Andrea, 15 F. Supp. 685, 687 (D.C.N.Y. 1936) (characterizing as
understandable view that "the law, not concerning itself with trifles, would ignore a mere casual
appropriation [ofa patented invention] for amusement or even scientific purpose"), modifiedon other
grounds, 90 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1937).
98. Bee, supra note 96, at 365.
99. 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass 1813) (No. 17,600).
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section 898 of the treatise with the phrase that "no act [is] an infringement
unless it affects the pecuniary interests of the owner of the patented
invention."'l"a In Robinson's view, these interests, or "emoluments," are not
affected when the accused infringer's use of the patented invention
"produce[s] no pecuniary result."'0 ' Robinson would have exempted an
invention "made or used as an experiment, whether for the gratification of
scientific tastes, or for curiosity, or for amusement."'0 2 In these cases,
Robinson contended, "the interests of the patentee are not antagonized, the
sole effect being of an intellectual character in the promotion of the
employer's knowledge or the relaxation afforded to his mind."' 3
In the years following Justice Story's decision in Whittemore, a number
of federal trial and appellate courts recognized the existence of an
experimental use exemption from infringement liability, but following the
Story-Robinson rule generally refused to apply the exemption because the
cases involved commercial activity or some degree of profit motive."° The
defense of experimental use was limited to those rare instances where the
accused infringer's use of a patented invention was for "the sole purpose of
gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement."'0 5




104. CHISUM, supra note 82, § 16.03[l ]. Although the opinion in Deuterium Corp. v. United States,
19 Cl. Ct. 624 (1990) (Rader, J.), seemed to recognize the reality ofprofit motive when it describedthe
experimental use exemption as "protect[ing] an individual making unauthorized use of a patent (a
potential infringer) during tests seeking advancement or commercialization of the patented teaching,"
id. at 632 (emphasis added), the court declined to apply the exemption in that case because the accused
steam cleaning, pilot plant-scale demonstration project represented "not strictly intellectual
experimentation, but development of technology and processes for commercial applications," id. at
633.
105. Popperhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279). One of the few
cases in which the experimental use doctrine was applied in favor of an accused infringer is Ruth v.
Stearns-Roger Manufacturing. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697, 703, 713 (D. Colo. 1935) (exempting from
infringement flotation machines and their parts used by Colorado School of Mines, which were "all
used in the laboratory and... cut up and changed from day to day"), rev'd on other grounds, 87 F.2d
35 (10th Cir. 1936). See also Chesterfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371,375-76 (Ct. Cl. 1958)
(stating in dicta that if patent in suit was not invalid, then defendant's use of patented metallic alloy
was for testing and experimentation and thus not infringing).
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2. Federal Circuit Development: Toward a Restrictive Application of
Experimental Use Exemption
The key case addressing the experimental use exemption in the modem
era is Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Company,1"6 which has
attracted significant scholarly commentary."0 7 The Roche decision led
Congress to enact 35 U.S.C. § 271(e), which legislatively overruled part,
but not all, of Roche by creating a safe harbor for using patented inventions
for regulatory data gathering.' 8 The "residue" of Roche, in terms of what
remains of the common law exemption from patent infringement for
experimental uses, is a focal point of this Article.
Roche sued Bolar for infringing Roche's U.S. patents on the active
ingredients of Dalmane, Roche's commercially successful prescription
sleeping aid.'0 9 Roche's patent was due to expire in early 1984."' Bolar,
planning to market a generic version of Dalmane as soon as the drug went
off-patent, chose to begin testing and gathering the data that would be
required for submission of a generic equivalent drug application to the
FDA before Roche's patent expired."' Bolar obtained the drug from
foreign sources and began using it in tests in 1983."2 The New York
federal district court held that Bolar's use of the patented compound for
federally mandated testing was experimental and de minimis and thus not
infringement. "'3
106. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
107. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 37; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987); Steven J. Grossman, Experimental Use
or Fair Use as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 30 IDEA 243 (1990); Ronald D. Hantman,
Experimental Use as an Exception to Patent Infringement, 67 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 617 (1985); Ned A.
Israelsen, Making, Using, and Selling Without Infringing: An Examination of35 U.S.C. Section 271(e)
and the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 457 (1989); Jordan P.
Karp, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety ofa Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J.
2169 (1991); Suzanne T. Michel, The Experimental Use Exception to Infringement Applied to
Federally Funded Inventions, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 369 (1992).
108. See infra Part IV.B.
109. Roche, 733 F.2d at 860. Roche was assignee of U.S. Patent No. 3,299,053. One of the chemical
compounds claimed in the '053 patent is flurazepam hydrochloride, the active ingredient in Roche's
"Dalmane" brand sleeping pill. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. Specifically, Bolar formed the drug into "dosage form capsules" with which it commenced
testing to obtain stability data, dissolution rates, bioequivalency studies, and blood serum studies
needed for an FDA New Drug Application. See id.
113. Id. at 860-61 ; Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 572 F. Supp. 255,258 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
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The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that Bolar was liable for
infringement."4 The Federal Circuit explained that on its face, § 271(a) of
the Patent Act prohibits any "making, using or selling.""' A mere "use"
that does not result in a sale is still actionable. 16 Thus, "the patentee does
not need to have any evidence of damage or lost sales to bring an
infiingement action."'"
17
Although the Federal Circuit held Bolar's use to be infringing, it stopped
short of adopting a definition of § 271(a) "use" in its "utmost possible
114. Roche, 733 F.2d at 867.
115. Id. at 861 (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. Id. The Roche court's stance would thus seem to have evolved away from the Story-Robinson
view that actionable harm to the patentee's pocketbook is required for patent infringement.
The historical origin of the inclusion of "use" of a patented invention as one of the U.S. patent
owner's exclusionary rights is uncertain. In post-Elizabethan England, patents were recognized as an
explicit exception to the general rule against monopolies, but the right granted by the Crown was
positively defined as the patent owner's affirmative right to "work" or "make" the invention:
Provided also and be it declared and enacted, that any declaration [against monopolies) before
mentioned shall not extend to any letters patent and grants of privilege for the term of fourteen
years or under, hereafter to be made of the sole working or making of any manner of new
manufactures within this Realm, to the true and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures,
which others at the time of making such letters patent and grants shall not use, so as also they be
not contrary to the law or mischievous to the State, by raising prices of commodities at home, or
hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient ....
English Statute of Monopolies, 1623, § 6 (emphasis added), reprintedin ED1THTILTON PENROSE, THE
ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 7 (1951). "Use" is of course an explicit part of
the qualification that the patented invention be one "which others at the time of making such letters
patents and grants shall not us," see id (emphasis added), but "use" in this manner merely denoted a
novelty requirement and did not form part of the exclusive right granted by the patent. The recited
exclusive right to "work" the patented invention may have been intended as synonymous with an
exclusive right to "use," but that interpretation is inconsistent with the separate presence of the terms
"work" and "use" in the same statutory provision.
The early U.S. patent system was strongly influenced by that of England. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952,
958 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (Rich, J.). But in contrast with Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, the first
federal patent statute in the United States explicitly included "use" within the definition of
infringement. Act of 1790, § I (defining patent grant as "sole and exclusive right and liberty of
making, constructing, using and vending to others to be used" the patented invention) (emphasis
added), reprinted in 9 LIPSCOMB'S WALKER ON PATENTS app. 2, at 9 (3d ed. 1990). The broader
definition of the patent right through the addition ofa"use" right may represent the first foreshadowing
of the broader treatment of patents generally in the United States, as compared to foreign systems.
Alternatively, the presence of "use" in the list of a patentee's exclusive rights may have been
intended to specifically refer to patents on processes or methods (then termed "arts"), which are used
rather than made or sold. If this assumption is correct, it does not explain the extension of the "use"
right to the other statutory categories of patentable subject matter, such as machines, manufactures, and
compositions of matter.
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scope.""' 8 The court cited Justice Story's opinion in Whittemore as the
origin of the common law experimental use doctrine" 9 and recognized that
one of the Federal Circuit's predecessor courts, the Court of Claims, had
considered the doctrine in several decisions. 20
The Federal Circuit in Roche ultimately interpreted this earlier authority
as having established a very restricted experimental use defense, but
refused to apply the defense to Bolar's clearly commercial activity:
[W]e hold the experimental use exception to be truly narrow, and we
will not expand it under the present circumstances. Bolar's argument
that the experimental use rule deserves a broad construction is not
justified.... Bolar's intended "experimental" use is solely for
business reasons and not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or
for strictly philosophical inquiry....
[Bolar's] unlicensed experiments conducted with a view to the
adaptation of the patented invention to the experimentor's business is
a violation of the rights of the patentee to exclude others from using
his patented invention. It is obvious here that it is a misnomer to call
the intended use de minimis. It is no trifle in its economic effect on
the parties even if the quantity used is small. It is no dilettante affair
such as Justice Story envisioned. We cannot construe the
experimental use rule so broadly as to allow a violation of the patent
laws in the guise of "scientific inquiry," when that inquiry has
definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes. 12'
Thus, after Roche, scientists engaged in research and development having
more than negligible commercial purpose could no longer rely on the
experimental use doctrine to exempt their experiments from patent
infringement liability.
118. Roche, 733 F.2d at 861.
119. Id. at 862.
120. The Federal Circuit in Roche characterized Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl.
1976) as "the most persuasive" of the Court of Claims cases concerning the experimental use defense.
Roche, 733 F.2d at 863; see also Pitcairn, 547 F.2d at 1124-26 (recognizing that experimental use may
be defense to infringement and that government's "tests, demonstrations, and experiments" were not
eligible for defense because they were "in keeping with the legitimate business of the using agency").
121. Roche, 733 F.2d at 863.
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B. The Hatch-Waxman Act: A Limited Exemption for Regulatory Data
Gathering
The generic-drug industry quickly and successfully moved to devise an
escape route from Roche." The industry argued to Congress that if a
generic-drug manufacturer had to wait to begin testing of an equivalent
drug until after the relevant patent had expired, the patentee of the branded
drug would receive a de facto extension of the patent term.12 Such an
extension was contrary to the public's interest in obtaining lower-cost
drugs as soon as possible and, of course, contrary to the profit-maximizing
goals of the generics. 24
The generic-drug companies' lobbying efforts succeeded. Congress
enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984,' 5 popularly known as the "Hatch-Waxman Act." The legislation
added, inter alia, § 271(e) to the Patent Act, which provides in pertinent
part that the use of a patented invention solely for purposes reasonably
related to gathering data to support an FDA application for generic versions
of previously approved drugs (i.e., an Abbreviated New Drug
Application) 26 is not patent infringement. 2 7
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently interpreted § 271(e) as broad
enough to encompass not only regulatory data gathering on
pharmaceuticals, but also the comparable testing of medical devices. 28 The
Court in EliLilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. limited its review of the Federal
Circuit's decision in Roche to the Circuit's refusal to exempt Bolar's
particular testing for generic-drug equivalency, however.29 The Federal
Circuit's recoguition in Roche of the less-specific common law exemption
for experimental uses of patented inventions was not addressed in EliLilly,
nor any subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decision.
122. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
123. Id. at 405.
124. Id. at 404-05.
125. Pub. L.No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
126. A generic-drug manufacturer submits an Abbreviated New Drug Application to the FDA in
order to seek expedited approval of the generic version ofa "listed drug" (one previously approved by
the FDA). Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The
generic drug must be the bioequivalent of the listed drug if an Abbreviated New Drug Application is
used. Id.
127. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1994).
128. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990) (affirming Federal Circuit's
interpretation).
129. Id. at 665.
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There are valid reasons to conclude that the common law exemption for
experimental use survived Congress's enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(e)'s
safe harbor, albeit in narrow form. In responding to the generic
manufacturers' concerns, it is reasonable to believe that Congress intended
to overrule the Roche holding only insofar as it impacted the generic
manufacturers-limited to unlicensed use of an invention for purposes of
gathering data for the FDA-but not to wipe away Roche's broader
recognition of the common law experimental use exemption. The
legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act makes no mention of the
common law doctrine discussed in Roche.3 ' It addresses no "use" of
patented inventions other than for the purpose of regulatory data gathering.
Nor does the legislative history indicate that by enacting § 271(e),
Congress intended to fill the field on this issue and preempt any and all
common law doctrines related to experimental use. 3'
Enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act supports, rather than detracts
from, a broadened interpretation of the common law experimental use
exemption that does not turn solely on the commerciality of the accused
infringer's use. Bolar's testing for purposes of gathering data needed to
expedite the FDA approval of its generic equivalent of Dalmane was
clearly profit-driven activity. Congress's exemption from liability of this
particular form of non-consensual, commercial use of a patented invention
should be viewed as supportive of, rather than in opposition to, the broader
proposition that certain unlicensed uses of patented inventions should be
exempted from liability. The legislative history does not indicate that by
enacting § 27 1(e) Congress meant to exempt one particular variety of
research use from infringement liability while forever excluding all others.
That Congress's intent was not so limited is also evidenced by subsequent
130. The legislative history notes only that "the net effect of the legislation is to reverse the holding
of the Federal Circuit in Roche." H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 27 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686,2711 ("The provisions of § 202 of the bill [amending 35 U.S.C. § 271 to add new
subsection (e)] have the net effect of reversing the holding of the court in Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar
Pharms. Co.").
The legislation was narrowly tailored to uses of patented products that are necessary for data-
gathering for regulatory approval. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14-15 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,2647-48 (stating that purposes of this legislation are "to make available more low
cost generic drugs and to create a new incentive for increased expenditures for research and
development of certain products which are subject to premarket approval").
131. But see id. at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2714 (quoting legislative-history
conclusion that "[j]ust as we have recognized the doctrine of fair use in copyright, it is appropriate to
create a similar mechanism in the patent law. That is all this bill does.'). While a positive justification
for passage of the legislation, this statement does not purport to define or broaden its scope beyond the
particular context of the exemption for regulatory data gathering purposes.
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legislative proposals to statutorily implement a second type of experimental
use provision in the Patent Act. "' Section 271 (e)'s narrow purview merely
reflects the successful lobbying of one particular industry: the generic-drug
manufacturers. Absent lobbying pressure from other sectors of the
patenting community, Congress would have had no reason or motivation to
enact a broader safe harbor at the time of passage of the Hatch-Waxman
Act. The fact that § 271(e) is limited to unlicensed use of patented
inventions for purposes of gathering FDA data does not refute a broadened
interpretation of the common law experimental use doctrine.
C. Whither the Residue ofRoche?
Following its 1984 decision in Roche, the Federal Circuit did not revisit
the common law experimental use doctrine for more than fifteen years.
33
In Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.,34 decided in June 2000, the
Federal Circuit re-confirmed the existence of the common law doctrine, but
refused to apply it to the accused infringer's "commercial" activity.
Embrex's patent in suit was directed to a method of inoculating chicks
against diseases while still in ovo, i.e., before hatching.3 The claimed
132. Four years after the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, Representative Kastenmeier
introduced a bill titled "Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act." H.R. 4970,100th Cong. (1988). In the
form in which the measure passed the House on September 13, 1988, the bill would have amended
Title 35 of the U.S. Code to declare that "[i]t shall not be an act of infringement for a person whose
occupation is farming to: reproduce a patented transgenic farm animal through breeding; use it in the
farming operation; or sell it or its offspring." See 134 CoNG. REc. 23,564 (1988) After passage in the
House, the measure was referred to a Senate committee and no farther action was taken. Id.
133. Although several intervening decisions cited Rocheindetermining whether the regulatory data-
gathering safe harbor of35 U.S.C. § 271 (e) should apply, the accused infringers in those cases did not
rely on the common law experimental use doctrine. E.g., Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d
1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520,1524-25
(Fed. Cir. 1992); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d402,404-06 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aftd, 496
U.S. 661 (1990).
Two recent Federal Circuit decisions in the Glaxo "Zantac" litigation have recognized, almost in
passing, the possibility of a related "de minimus" exception to infringement, but both times the court
has refrained from deciding the issue. See Glaxo, Inc. v. TorPharm, Inc., 153 F.3d 1366,1374n.3 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (citing Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1566 n.l (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The
Glaxo patents were directed to ranitidine hydrochloride, which can occur in at least two crystalline
forms. Glaxo, 153 F.3d at 1368. The issue raised, but not decided, was whether Glaxo's Patent No.
4,521,43 1, which was limited to Form 2, was infringed by the accused infringer's making of the Form
I compound that was 99.5% pure, but included 0.5% Form 2. Id. at 1374 n.3. The Federal Circuit
recognized earlier case law that speaks of a de minimus exception, but chose not to reach the issue
because other issues in the case were dispositive. Id.
134. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
135. Ide at 1346.
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method required administration of a vaccine within the "region defined by
either the amnion or the yolk sac." 13 6 Accused infringer Service
Engineering retained scientific consultants to help it design around the
Embrex patents, but was unsuccessful in avoiding infringement; Service
Engineering's scientists were unable to prevent injection into the claimed
amnion or yolk region.'37 A jury found that Service Engineering had
willfully infringed, and the district court denied Service Engineering's
motion for judgment as a matter of law.'38
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected Service Engineering's argument
that the accused tests were merely experimental and thus exempt from
infringement liability under the common law experimental use doctrine."'
Citing Roche, the Federal Circuit reiterated that it construes the
experimental use exception "very narrowly."'" The court also
acknowledged that "[b]inding precedent" recognizes a "narrow defense to
infringement performed 'for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for
strictly philosophical inquiry."" 4 Service Engineering's tests did not
qualify for the defense, the Federal Circuit concluded, in view of the
district court's findings that the tests were performed "expressly for
commercial purposes,"'42 and were chiefly conducted by Service
Engineering in order to sell its own in ovo injection machines to potential
customers. 143
The Federal Circuit's recognition of the common law experimental use
doctrine in Embrex clarifies that Congress did not overrule that portion of
Roche in which the Federal Circuit first recognized the common law
doctrine.'" Even for unlicensed uses of patented inventions that do not fall
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1346-47.
138. Id. at 1347.
139. Id. at 1349.
140. Id. (citing Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
141. Id. at 1349 (citing Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858,863 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Pitcaim v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1978)).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Notably, the Embrex court cites Roche as having been "superseded on other grounds by 35
U.S.C. § 271 (e) (1994)." Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1349 (emphasis added). This characterization of Roche
indicates that the Federal Circuit does not view Congress's 1984 enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)'s
safe harbor for regulatory data gathering use as having overruled Roche in its entirety; i.e., as having
overruled those statements in Roche respecting the common law experimental use doctrine. In other
words, Embrex establishes that the post-Roche 1984 passage ofthe Hatch-Waxman Act did not repeal
sub silentio the common law experimental use doctrine.
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within § 271(e)'s safe harbor for regulatory data-gathering, the common
law experimental use defense remains available, at least theoretically. As
illustrated by Service Engineering's failure to prevail under the
experimental use defense in Embrex, however, the Federal Circuit's
extremely narrow interpretation of the doctrine virtually precludes
successful reliance by any commercial enterprise. Few users of patented
methodologies will be able to mount a more compelling case for exemption
from infringement liability than Service Engineering did; rather than
proceeding to use Embrex's patented method without permission, Service
Engineering retained outside scientists for the commendable purpose of
attempting to design around Embrex's patent by developing an alternative
method sufficiently different to avoid Embrex's claims. This kind of
activity should be facilitated, rather than penalized, by patent law.145
Federal Circuit Judge Rader concurred in Embrex, but wrote a separate
opinion contending that the experimental use defense is no longer viable
following the U.S. Supreme Court's 1997 statement in Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. 146 that "'[a]pplication of the doctrine of
equivalents.., is akin to determining literal infringement, and neither
requires proof of intent.'"147 In Judge Rader's view, "[t]he Supreme Court's
recent reiteration that infringement does not depend on the intent
underlying the allegedly infringing conduct.., precludes any further
experimental use defense, even in the extraordinarily narrow form
recognized in Roche.''148 According to Judge Rader, when "wholly non-
commercial" infringement is proven, "the damage computation process
provides full flexibility for courts to preclude large (or perhaps any) awards
for minimal infringement.'
149
Contrary to Judge Rader's concurrence, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Warner-Jenkinson did not create new law nor change the law with respect
to the common law experimental use doctrine. The accused infringer in
Warner-Jenkinson did not rely on the experimental use doctrine, nor did
the case involve the use of research tools; both parties were commercial
145. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress ofScience: Exclusive Rights andExperimental
Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1078(1989) (contending that patent holder should not be able to enjoin
researcher who uses patented invention in course of attempting to develop alternative means of
achieving same purpose).
146. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
147. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J.,
concurring) (quoting Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 34).
148. Id. (Rader, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 1352 (Rader, J., concurring).
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manufacturers of purified dyes."'° Rather, liability turned on whether the
accused infringer's dye purification method, operating at a pH of 5,
infringed the patent owner's claimed method for purifying dyes at a pH
"from approximately 6.0 to 9.0."'' The accused infringer asserted that it
independently developed its own process with no knowledge of the
plaintiffs patent. 52 On this basis, the accused infringer contended that the
patent owner should be required to establish, as an equitable threshold
factor, an "intent to copy" on the part of the accused infringer, before the
patent owner could assert infringement under a doctrine of equivalents
theory.'53 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that
because the "essential predicate" of the doctrine of equivalents is the
identity between the claimed invention and its equivalent, there is no basis
for treating an infringing equivalent any differently from a device that
literally infringes. 54 The Court concluded that "intent plays no role in the
application of the doctrine of equivalents."' 55 Thus, Warner-Jenkinson
merely establishes that an accused infringer need not be aware of the
plaintiff's patent in order to be liable for infringing it. In no way does
Warner-Jenkinson hold or suggest that an accused infringer's experimental
or research purpose is irrelevant to the question of infringement liability or
remedy. Moreover, an accused infringer's purpose or intent has been held
relevant in other aspects of the infringement determination.'56
Judge Rader's suggestion that accused infringers who assert the
experimental use defense are adequately protected by the courts' flexibility
in adjusting the damages award for "minimal or non-commercial
150. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997).
151. Id. at 22-23.
152. Id. at 23 (noting that Warner-Jenkinson did not learn of Hilton Davis's patent until "after
[Warner-Jenkinson] had begun commercial use of its ultrafiltration process").
153. Id. at 34-36.
154. Id. at 35.
155. Id. at 36.
156. For example, in determining whether an infringement was willful, which may lead to an award
of enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994), the Federal Circuit looks to whether the accused
infringer was aware of the plaintiff's patent, and once aware, whether the accused infringer proceeded
to act with due care and in good faith (e.g., obtained a competent non-infringement or invalidity
opinion of counsel before proceeding with manufacture). E.g., Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d
816, 826-31 (Fed. Cir. 1992). More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that the nature and
purpose of a state government's patent infringement (i.e., whether it was merely "negligent" rather than
"intentional or reckless") governs whether the state's infringement violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 645 (1999).
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infringement" ' 7 is also problematic. Although compensatory damages
might be reduced to a nominal level under Judge Rader's proposed
framework, a research tool user would nevertheless remain subject to an
injunction against any further use of the patented tool. Moreover,
compelling the research tool user to litigate the question of liability and
damages in the hopes that damages might be reduced to a nominal level
ignores the tremendous costs of patent litigation."' 8
D. District Court Decisions: Continued Vitality of the Common Law
Exemption
Several lower courts have had occasion to address the exemption
following Roche. The emergent consensus is that Roche's recognition of a
general common law exemption continues to have vitality after the
enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
157. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
158. The different judicial viewpoints expressed in Embrex with respect to the viability of the
common law experimental use doctrine will likely be fleshed out in future Federal Circuit decisions as
pending litigation over unlicensed use of research tools wends its way toward appeal. E.g., Cohen,
supra note 37, at 28 (describing lawsuit filed in July 1998 by Chiron Corporation, owner of patents
directed to hepatitis C viral protease enzyme, against Vertex, corporation involved in research and
development efforts to find drugs that block enzyme, in which Vertex has invoked experimental use
exemption as defense).
The experimental use defense is also at issue in Integra v. Merck a patent infringement lawsuit
currently pending in the Southern District of California. See Integra LifeSciences I Ltd. v. Merck
KgaA, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1846 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (granting summary judgment on single claim of one of
five patents in suit). Merck, a German corporation, is a co-defendant in the action with the Scripps
Research Institute, a nonprofit, public benefit corporation, and Dr. David A. Cheresh, a tenured
professor in Scipps's Immunology Department. Id. at 1847. Scripps and Merck entered into a research
support agreement in 1988 to fund Dr. Cheresh's study of"integrins," proteins that serve as receptors
on the surface of certain living cells. Id. As part of the agreement, Scripps granted Merck an option to
license any inventions arising from Dr. Cheresh's work. Id. When Dr. Cheresh reported his findings
that the growth of new blood vessels can be inhibited by binding various molecules to receptors on the
surface of certain cells, Integra sued Cheresh, Scripps, and Merck in order to enjoin Cheresh's further
work on his discovery and to "collect damages for the underlying research." Id. The defendants
asserted that the experimental use doctrine shields them from infringement liability, but Integra
contended that the defense was unavailable to them because Merck is a for-profit entity. E-mail
Interview with William C. Rooklidge, counsel for defendants (May 25, 2000). The trial court granted
judgement as a matter of law that the defendant's pre-1995 activities were exempt under the
experimental use doctrine. Id. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the experimental use
defense with respect to the defendants' post-1994 activities; however, ajury found that those activities
infringed Integra's patents. Id. As of January 2001, the case was still pending before the trial court on
post-trial motions. Id.
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The clearest judicial support for a viable exemption is the Claims Court
decision in Deuterium Corp. v. United States.'59 Then-Claims Court Judge
Rader, now a member of the Federal Circuit, cited the Robinson treatise as
support for the doctrine and explained that "[a]lthough [the Hatch-Waxman
Act] changed that narrow application of the doctrine affecting reporting
requirements for federal drug laws, Congress did not disturb the Federal
Circuit's enunciation [in Roche] of the parameters of the experimental use
exception.'
160
The view that the experimental use exemption remains valid was
seconded by the federal district court in Giese v. Pierce Chemical, Co. 161
The end users of Giese's patented methods of detecting cancer cells were
largely academic researchers. 62 Giese sued two chemical companies as
contributory and inducing infringers based on their acts of supplying the
academic research institutions with kits of chemical reagents for use in
Giese's patented method. 63 Although the trial court denied the defendant
chemical companies' motion for summary judgment of non-infringement
because of unresolved factual disputes,64 it gave strong support to the
notion that the experimental use doctrine survives. The Roche decision
"establish[es] a restrictive definition of the traditional common law
doctrine, but in no way eliminat[es] it in those cases which involve
experimentation for 'idle curiosity or for strictly philosophical inquiry. "1 65
159. 19 Cl. Ct. 624 (1990).
160. Id. at 632 n.14.
161. 29 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D. Mass. 1998) (Young, J.).
162. Id. at 35.
163. Id. at 34-35.
164. Id. at 37.
165. Id. at 36 (quoting Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc. 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir.
1984)). The court in Giese further suggested, albeit in dicta, that ifend users of a patented method are
exempt from infringement liability because they are beneficiaries of the experimental use exemption,
then their suppliers by definition cannot be liable as contributory infringers. Id. at 36. Non-liability
would hold even where the suppliers, as in Giese, were decidedly for-profit enterprises. Id. This result
certainly follows from application of the black-letter patent rule that there can be no contributory
infringement without direct infringement. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377
U.S. 476,483 (1964); see also Ruth v. Steams-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697, 703 (D. Colo. 1935)
(holding that sale of parts for use in accused flotation machine did not constitute contributory
infringement where machine was used in laboratory of Colorado School of Mines for experimental
purposes), rev'd on other grounds, 87 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1936). Moreover, the pro-innovation policies
underlying the recognition of a viable research use exemption would be stymied if the research user
could not obtain necessary supplies from for-profit sources for fear that these sources would be subject
to indirect liability under § 271 (b) or (c) or both of the Patent Act.
The Giese court's decision allowing suppliers of the direct infringer to share in the benefits of the
experimental use exemption, ajudge-made doctrine of equitable roots, thus seems to assume without
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR ACADEMIC-INDUSTRIAL
COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Much of the burgeoning biotechnology research and development
activity in the U.S. involves public-private partnerships, collaborations,
joint ventures, sponsored research, and the like between nonprofit
universities or research institutions and for-profit corporations." Many
deciding that the experimental use exemption is not a personal defense, limited to the individuals
actually conducting the experimentation. This treatment contrasts the newly enacted "prior inventor
defense," which is personal to the defendant prior user and can only be licensed or transferred as part
of a good faith transfer of the prior user's entire line of business. See American Inventors Protection
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (amending Title 35, U.S.C., by adding new § 273
titled "Defense to Infringement Based on Earlier Inventor"). The potential for exploiting the
exemption, thus interpreted, to absolve large commercial, profit-making suppliers of liability,
whenever their customers are deemed to be conducting research or experimentation, looms large.
The contributory liability of a research-tool supplier is also at issue in the long-running patent
litigation battle between Hoffman-La Roche, the Swiss corporate holder of patents on polymerase
'chain reaction (PCR) and Taq polymerase, the key reagent used in PCR, and Promega Corporation, a
Wisconsin supplier of Taq to researchers across the United States. See supra notes 1-11 and
accompanying text. Roche sued Promega in October 1992 for selling Taq in violation of the terms of
Promega's license granted by the now-defunct Cetus Corporation, the original owner of the patents.
See Barinaga, supra note 7, at 1273. Roche reads that license as limiting Promega to sales of Taq for
non-PCR purposes; Promega disputes this interpretation. Abate, supra note 3, at B 1; Barinaga, supra
note 7, at 1273; Rubenstein,supra note 2, at 28. Among other contentions, Hoffman-La Roche asserts
that Promega is liable for contributory or inducing infringement of the PCR method patent based on
Promega's sales of Taq to more than 200 researchers whom Roche identified as direct infringers
(though not named as parties to the lawsuit). See Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 28. One of the several
patents involved in the dispute was held unenforceable in December 1999 for inequitable conduct.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., No. C-93-1748 VRW, 1999 WL 1797330 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
7, 1999) (holding all claims of U.S. Patent No. 4,889,818 unenforceable).
166. NIH Research Tools Report, supra note 24 (explaining that since mid-I 970s "(b]iomedical
researchers increasingly chose to collaborate with entrepreneurial companies that understood and
valued basic science, or to leave academia and join these firms as founders or employees. Many
biotechnology companies emerged with strong ties to the academic world.'); see also Florida, supra
note 33, at 69 (reporting dramatic growth ofjoint university-industry research centers as evidencedby
1990 Camegie Mellon University study of 1,056 such U.S. centers that received total funding of more
than $4.12 billion); David E. Korn, Patent and Trade Secret Protection in University-Industry
Research Relationships in Biotechnology, 24 HARV. J. LEGIS. 191, 191 (1987) (noting "rapid and
substantial growth in biotechnology research conducted jointly by industry and academia" in recent
years); id. at 222 (characterizing industry-sponsored research as "big business" formany U.S. research
universities); Rai, supra note 37, at 110 (contending that legal developments in 1980s and 1990s,
including passage of Bayh-Dole Act and pro-patent decisions by the Federal Circuit, have generated
"large variety of academic-industrial relationships," some of which resemble commercial joint
ventures, and citing examples); Jeff Gerth & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, DrugMakers Reap Profits on Tax-
BackedResearch, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,2000, at 20 (reporting that since enactment of Bayh-Dole Act,
universities and their scientists have become'more commercially oriented, many are spinning offtheir
own biotech companies to develop their ideas.").
A widely publicized biotechnology nonprofit and industry collaboration was formed in May 1998
when The Institute for Genomic Research (TIGR), a private, nonprofit research enterprise headed by
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private corporations are shifting their research and development resources
toward "external innovation,' ' 67 building on the results of research
conducted in universities rather than by their own in-house research staff.1
68
Private industry is estimated to have funded approximately twelve percent
of university research and development activity in the life sciences in
1994,169 and that percentage has likely increased in subsequent years.
170
Seventy percent of the funding for clinical trials of new drugs comes from
private industry rather than the federal government.
17 1
The 1980 enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act 7 1 fundamentally enhanced
the incentives for such collaborations; an explicit objective of the Act was
Doctor J. Craig Venter, joined forces with the Perkin-Elmer Corporation, a leading manufacturer of
DNA sequencing devices. The collaboration announced plans to compete against the federal
government's Human Genome Project in attempting to sequence the entire human genome. Genetic
Warfare, ECONOMIST, May 16, 1998, at 87.
167. Gerth & Stolberg, supra note 166, at 1, 20 (describing Bayh-Dole Act as having allowed
private corporations engaged in drug development to "shift resources away from in-house research and
development and towards outside collaborations, a strategy known as 'external innovation").
168. Korn, supra note 166, at 196 (contending that firms in biotechnology industry are much more
dependent on university research than are firms in other technologies); Philip H. Abelson, Editorial:
Global Technology Competition, 277 SCIENCE 1587 (1997) (stating that only about six percent of U.S.
industry research and development expenditures are "devoted to longer range directed basic research");
Richard C. Atkinson, Universities: At the Center of U.S. Research, 276 SCIENCE 1479 (1997)
(describing changing pattern of U.S. corporate research and development in last decade, evolving from
conduct of"significant basic research" in-house to current model in which corporations "build[] on the
results of long-term university research" to solve "specific short-term problems').
169. David Blumenthal et al., Relationships Between Academic Institutions and Industry in the Life
Sciences-An Industry Study, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 368, 369 (1996). More than ninety percent of
U.S. firms in the life sciences reported some relationship with academia in 1994; almost sixty percent
of such firms supported research conducted by academic institutions. Id.
170. Cf Abelson, supra note 168, at 1587 (reporting that total corporate support for U.S. research
and development has increased by about twenty-seven percent since 1994); Nelsen, supra note 26, at
1460-61 (noting that following corporate downsizing of late 1980s and early 1990s, industry has
displayed increased interest in establishing research partnerships with universities); Timothy Caulfield,
The Commercialization of Human Genetics: Profits and Problems, MOLECULAR MED. TODAY, Apr.
1998, at 148 (reporting "substantial growth in the number of academic industry collaborations');
Charles F. Larson, The Boom in Industry Research, ISsuEs SCi. & TECH., Summer 2000, at 27 (stating
that industry support of all university research has grown from $1.45 billion in 1994 to $2.16 billion in
1999).
171. Thomas Bodenheimer, Health Policy Report: Uneasy A lliance-Clinical Investigators and the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1539,1539 (2000). "Clinical"research involves the
design, conduct, and interpretation of drug testing on human subjects, and thus represents a later stage
ofthe research process than "basic" research. See Marcia Angell, Is Academic Medicinefor Sale?, 342
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1516, 1517 (2000) (arguing that in clinical research most technology development
has already been completed and is simply being tested).
172. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3019,3019-28 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212
(1994)).
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"to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit
organizations, including universities." '73 As a result of the Bayh-Dole Act,
the interest level in university-industry partnerships is significantly greater
than before the legislation's enactment. 74 The Bayh-Dole Act encourages
universities to patent "subject inventions" made with federal government
funds, 75 and contemplates the grant of exclusive licenses under those
patents to the universities' private-sector partners. 76 Predictably, university
patenting activity'" and university revenues from patent licensing fees have
increased dramatically since the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act.'78 So too
have problems of access to patented research tools.'79
173. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1994) ("Policy and Objective"). The enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act has
been viewed as part ofa broader push by the Reagan administration in the early 1980s to maintain the
United States's stance as an international leader in technological development in the face of increasing
imports of high-quality electronic goods from Japan. Gerth & Stolberg, supra note 166, at 1, 20.
174. See Angell, supra note 171, at 1517 (describing Bayh-Dole Act as "frequently invoked to
justify the ubiquitous ties between academia and industry"); Nelsen, supra note 26, at 1460-61
(describing increasing interest in research partnerships between industry and universities, on the part of
both groups, as having developed in parallel with formation of Bayh-Dole Act university licensing
framework); see also Blumenthal et al.,supra note 169, at 368 (describing greater acceptance in 1990s
among life-sciences academics of relationships with industry than in 1980s).
175. 35 U.S.C. § 202 ("Disposition of Rights").
176. Nelsen, supra note 26, at 1460-61 (stating university position that right to grant exclusive
licenses is "key aspect" of Bayh-Dole Act because substantial risk taken by licensees to develop
"early-stage technologies'justifies exclusivity); Raisupranote37, at 97 n.1 13;Editorial: ThePatent
Craze and Academia, 342 LANCEr 1435, 1435 (1993) [hereinafter Editorial] (characterizing Bayh-
Dole Act as having made it easier for universities and nonprofit research institutions to obtain and
exclusively license patents); see also 35 U.S.C. § 203 (referring to "exclusive licensee"as entity that is
subject to march-in rights). The federal government always retains a nonexclusive, paid-up license to
practice a subject invention. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4).
177. The number of patents annually assigned to U.S. academic institutions, including colleges,
universities, and associations thereof, has increased dramatically from 1984, when 551 utility patents
were issued to these institutions, to 1997, when the number of patents issued to U.S. academic
institutions had increased to 2436. Technology Assessment and Forecast Report, U.S. Colleges and
Universities-Utility Patent Grants 1969-1997 5 (Sept. 1998), at
http:llwww.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ_97.pdf. Most of this patenting activity was in
the life sciences. See id. at 6 (listing five biotechnological and chemical patent classes (Classes 800,
435, 530, 536, and 424) in six classes of highest university patenting activity). The 158 universities
surveyed by the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) reported patent application
filings of more than 6000 in the year 1997 alone. See Florida, supra note 33, at 68.
178. See Florida, supra note 33, at 68 (describing universities' increasing focus on technology
licensing to generate income and reporting that approximately 3000 licenses granted by U.S.
universities to industry in 1998 generated approximately $500 million in royalties); see also Gerth &
Stolberg, supra note 166, at 1, 20 (reporting that Bayh-Dole Act represents "a windfall" for
universities).
179. See Flores, supra note 49, at 819 (reporting "[r]ising frustration among scientists about
difficulties in accessing critical research tools"); Nelsen, supra note 26, at 1460-61 (listing "[r]estricted
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Under the traditional "narrow" view of the experimental use exemption
in the United States as set forth in Roche, this type of collaborative research
and development generally does not qualify for exemption. It is difficult to
posit a collaboration involving a for-profit firm as having anything other
than "definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes."'
180
Indeed, the Bayh-Dole Act expressly promotes the commercialization of
inventions made by universities."'I
This Article contends that the Roche treatment of "pure"
experimentation for "philosophical" purposes versus "commercialization"
as two polar extremes is no longer supportable. A better way to view such
use is as overlapping regions on a continuum of experimental use. The
sharp distinctions drawn by the Roche court have blurred dramatically in
the last twenty years. ' The fundamental changes to the U.S. research and
technology sector, brought about by the Bayh-Dole Act and other legal,
technical and marketplace factors,'83 are breaking down traditional barriers
between academic research and for-profit commercialization. Research
tools are at the heart of the research and commercialization overlap. 84 The
experimental use doctrine requires appropriate flexibility to reflect this
changing research and development landscape.
The public policies promoted by choosing to exempt "philosophical"
research from liability while denying the benefits of the exemption to
innovation having the slightest "commercial" flavor are suspect. Society
benefits from new therapeutic and diagnostic products, whether or not they
availability or delays in exchange of 'research tools' (such as vectors or transgenic mice) in biological
research" as unresolved problem facing university technology-transfer management).
180. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858,863 (Fed. Cir. 1984). This would appear
to hold even when industry funds "basic" rather than "applied" research. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 37,
at 1023 n.26 (contending that "[a]cademic researchers whose work is funded by industry are likely to
be motivated by 'philosophical' and 'commercial' interests at the same time").
181. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1994).
182. Dunn, supra note 27, at B3 ("Defining when research becomes commercial is tricky, given that
an experiment done in a university lab today may be the founding idea for a biotech company
tomorrow.").
183. See Nelsen, supra note 26, at 1460-61 (describing drive to balance federal budget and decline
of communism (resulting in fewer military research expenditures) as two key events leading to reduced
federal government funding of research and development, and contending that this reduction in
government funding has led U.S. universities to seek increased research and development funding from
private industry).
184. See McConathy & Weber, supra note 40, at 177-78 (describing research tools as existing at
overlap "where universities seek patents and royalties, where industry finances and supports academic
research, and where collaborations between the two occur").
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arose from a profit motive."' Arguably, society may benefit more when
profit motive drives innovation. This is because industry funding of
university research tends to focus on short-term projects leading to
marketable products rather than longer-term basic research.'86 Thus, the
"anti-commercialism" element of the experimental use doctrine as
currently interpreted actually works against the prompt introduction of new
drugs and therapies into the market place.
Profit motive should no longer be held antithetical to the experimental
use doctrine. A re-conceptualization of the experimental use doctrine must
consider the commercial realities of the twenty-first century research and
development process. The involvement of a for-profit firm in the use of
patented research tools to develop new products should not be treated as
per se outside the scope of the experimental use doctrine. Foreign patent
systems have adopted legal rules that come much closer to reflecting these
notions than has the United States, as demonstrated in the next Part.
V. INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF AN EXPERIMENTAL
USE EXEMPTION
National patent systems other than that of the United States have
generally accepted the concept of an exemption from patent infringement
for experimental or research use of a patented invention.' This acceptance
is consistent with the international patent community's greater tolerance of
185. See Barton, supra note 15, at 457 ( Under current law the exemption most likely applies only
for noncommercial purposes ... yet, the benefit to society of the follow-on research does not depend
on whether the research is done for commercial or noncommercial purposes.") (citation omitted).
186. Editorial, supra note 176, at 1436 (1993) ("Private industry is unlikely to provide funding for
basic research in areas in which societal benefit is not immediately apparent but could ultimately be
realized with lengthy and continued nurturing.").
187. For example, French law provides that'l"a]cts accomplished for personal or domestic purposes
or for the purpose of testing the object of the patented invention shall not be considered as affecting the
patentee's rights.' French Patent Law Including Modifications of 1978, Art. 29, reprinted in 2D JOHN
P. SINNOTETAL., WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE (1999), at FRANCE-9. Germany provides that
the "effects of the patent shall not extend to... acts done for experimental purposes relating to the
subject matter of the patented invention." German Patent Act of 16 December 1980, § 11.2, reprinted
in 2D SINNOTr ET AL.,supra, at WEST GERMANY-78.22. Great Britain exempts from infringement
liability those acts "done privately and for purposes which are not commercial" as well as those acts
"done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the invention.' Patent Act 1977,
§ 60(5), reprinted in 2D SINNoTr ETAL.,supra, at GREAT BRITAIN-269. The Japanese patent laws
provide that "[t]he effects of the patent right shall not extend to the working of the patent right for the
purposes of experiment or research.'Japanese Patent Law of 1959, as amended through May 6, 1998,
effective June 1, 1998, § 69(1), reprinted in 2F SINNOTr ET AL.,supra, at JAPAN-194.
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incursions on patent exclusivity such as working requirements and
compulsory licensing.
For example, Germany's patent laws provide that "'[t]he effects of the
patent shall not extend to acts performed for experimental purposes relating
to the subject-matter of the patented invention."",188 The Federal Supreme
Court of Germany recently interpreted this provision to absolve from
liability certain clinical trials of a patented pharmaceutical, although the
trials were conducted for the purpose of finding new applications for the
pharmaceutical.' 89 The court indicated that the exemption would be
available even if the unlicensed use resulted in the accused infringer filing
a patent application on the results of its research."9°
An experimental use exemption is included in the European
Commission's proposed Council Regulation on the Community Patent.' 9'
Article 9 of the proposed regulation excludes from the effects of a
Community patent those acts "done privately and for non-commercial
purposes," 92 and those "acts done for experimental purposes relating to the
subject-matter of the patented invention.' ' 93 The term "relating to" is not
188. Wolfgang von Meibom & Johann Pitz, Experimental Use and Compulsory License Under
German Patent Law, PATENT WORLD, June/July 1997, at 27 (quoting Section 11, No. 2 of German
Patent Act of 1981).
189. Von Meibom & Pitz, supra note 188, at 29 (describing German Supreme Court, GRUR 1996,
109-clinical trials (November 7, 1995)). According to these commentators, application of the
exemption from liability does not turn on "whether, over and above the character of pure research,
commercial interests are also in the background." Id.; see also Christian Hertz-Eichenrode, Germany,
in 1 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (1999), at GER-14 (characterizing
German Supreme Court decisions as giving "wide interpretation" to Germany's experimental use
provision, German Patent Act of 16 December 1980, § 11.2).
190. Von Meibom & Pitz, supra note 188, at 29.
191. Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the
Community Patent, 69 (Aug. 1, 2000), available at http:lleuropa.eu.int/comm/intemal market/
en/intprop/indprop/412en.pdf [hereinafter Community Patent]. The proposed regulation provides for
the grant of a unitary "Community patent" of equal effect throughout the European Community. Id.
§ 2.4.1, at 9 ("Explanatory Memorandum"). A newly-created, centralized "Community Intellectual
Property Court" with Community-wide jurisdiction will determine enforcement and validity questions.
Id. § 2.4.5.1, at 13. The proposed regulation on the Community Patent is independent from the
European Patent Convention (EPC), which was signed in 1973. Id. § 1.1, at 4. The EPC provides a
single procedure for the examination of patent applications in the European Patent Office. Id. Once a
European patent has been granted, however, it becomes a national patent in each member country
designated by the applicant, and is subject to the patent laws of each such designated country. Id. The
EPC does not provide any Community-wide enforcement forum; rather, any infringement of a
European patent "shall be dealt with by national law." European Patent Convention, Art. 64(3),
available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar64.html (last modified Nov. 8,2000).
192. Community Patent, supra note 19 1, at Art. 9(a).
193. Id. Art. 9(b).
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defined, but suggests a scope broad enough to envision the use of patented
research tools. The proposed regulation follows a thirty-year effort to create
a unitary Community patent.194 The European Council has recommended
that the Community patent be implemented by the end of 2001."'
Japanese patent laws provide that "[t]he effects of the patent right shall
not extend to the working of the patent right for the purposes of experiment
or research."' 96 Japan has implemented an experimental use exemption in
reverse fashion from the United States; Japan provides a broad exemption
for experimental use, but generic-drug manufacturers have had to rely on
the judiciary for an interpretation placing them within the exemption. The
Supreme Court of Japan recently held that the statutory exemption does
apply to the testing of patented drugs for purposes of obtaining the data
required for application to manufacture a generic equivalent under Japan's
Drugs, Cosmetics and Medical Instruments Act.'97
The NIH Working Group contends that these foreign patent systems
properly distinguish between "experimenting on a patented invention-i.e.,
using a patented invention to study the underlying technology or perhaps to
invent around the patent," and "experimenting with a patented invention to
study something else."' 98 The Working Group suggests that treating the
former as eligible for the research exemption and the latter as ineligible is a
"sensible distinction,""' because:
It is difficult to imagine how a broader research exemption could be
formulated without effectively eviscerating the value of patents on
research tools. Researchers are ordinary consumers of patented
research tools, and if these consumers were exempt from
infringement liability, the patent holder would have nowhere else to
turn to collect patent royalties. An excessively broad research
exemption could eliminate incentives for private firms to develop and
194. Id. § 1.1, at4 ("Explanatory Memorandum").
195. Id. § 4, at 69 ("Impact Assessment Form").
196. Japanese Patent Law of 1959, as amended through May 6, 1998, effective June 1, 1998,
§ 69(l), reprinted in 2F SINNOTT Er AL., supra note 187, at JAPAN-194.
197. YusukeHirakiJapan: Patents-Infringement-ExperimentaI Use Exemptedfor Clinical Trials,
21 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. N-140 (1999) (reporting decision of Japanese Supreme Court in
Ono Pharm. Co. Ltd. v. Kyoto Pharm. Ltd., Case 1998 (Ju) No. 153 (Apr. 16, 1999).
198. NIH Research Tools Report, supra note 24, at App. D-8.
199. Id.
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disseminate new research tools, which could on balance do more
harm than good to the research enterprise.2°
The Working Group's position that a broadened experimental use rule
should not be available to those "working with" a patented invention (e.g.,
those using the patented invention as a research tool) is reasonable only if
such workers are truly "ordinary consumers" of the tool. In other words,
these research workers can freely acquire the tools they need in the
marketplace at reasonable cost via anonymous purchasing without the need
for licensing transactions. The growing incidence of high transaction costs
associated with accessing multiple patented research tools20 1 contravenes
the ordinary consumer assumption, however. When research tool
transaction costs are severe enough to impede or stop the development of
new biomedical products, line-drawing between "experimenting on" and
"experimenting with" is no longer justified. In such cases, access to the
experimental use doctrine should not turn on the relatively fine distinction
between experimenting on or experimenting with the patented invention. 2
The Working Group's concern that a broadened experimental use
doctrine would leave holders of research tool patents uncompensated and
without sufficient incentives to develop new research tools is a valid one if
all non-consensual tool users were given a complete exemption from
liability. A more viable alternative, however, is the adoption of a liability
rule under which the patent holder cannot enjoin the researcher's use, but
will obtain an ex post royalty based on the marketplace valuation of
products developed through use of the tool. The research user's access
problem is alleviated because a license need not be negotiated prior to the
use and an appropriate level of royalty to the patent holder will ensure that
incentives to innovate are not significantly decreased.0 3
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 31-36.
202. The general notion of discerning whether a patented invention has been "experimented on"
rather than "experimented with" may be an exercise in semantics. Consider, for example, the case of a
widget manufacturer who seeks to avoid infringement liability by designing around the widget patent
of a competitor. The manufacturer's goal is to develop an acceptable but non-infringing alternative.
Has the manufacturer experimented on the competitor's widget in designing around it, or experimented
with it?
203. Part Vit infra discusses this proposal.
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VI. RESPONDING TO TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST A
BROADENED EXPERIMENTAL USE DOCTRINE
This Article proposes to broaden the "truly narrow" experimental use
defense as it is currently interpreted in the United States. Where transaction
costs of accessing patented research tools are severe enough to impede or
halt the development of new products important to public health, the non-
consensual "development use" of such tools should be permitted without
injunction, in exchange for an ex post royalty payment based on the
marketplace value of the newly created products.' This Part responds to a
number of the traditional arguments against expanding the experimental
use doctrine and provides additional justifications for re-thinking the
doctrine to address the research tools access dilemma.
A. Incentive Function ofExclusivity
The most commonly stated objection to broadening the experimental use
doctrine is the possibility that it would significantly reduce the incentives
for invention of new research tools."' Any reduction in the value ofpatents
as drivers for new innovation might result in either a decreased level of
innovation or a shift away from disclosure; i.e., protecting inventions as
trade secrets rather than by patenting. If a reduction in innovation were to
result from a broadened experimental use doctrine, then modifying the
experimental use doctrine merely trades one problem for another.
The extent of any potential reduction in innovation, and the optimal
balance between a desired level of innovation in research tools versus
innovation in new commercial products developed through the unrestricted
use of those tools, are probably impossible to determine."6 Although an
expanded experimental use doctrine might feasibly result in some reduction
in the development of new research tools, it is just as likely that lessening
the probability of the royalty stacking problem will promote increased
development of new products that require the use of multiple tools. The
204. Id.
205. Karp, supra note 107, at 2181 (contending that "(a]n expansive experimental use exception,
which threatens the patentee's potential for economic returns, would reduce inventive activity,
particularly in those industries that rely heavily on patent protection").
206. Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 1030-31 (stating that level ofreductionin incentives to invent that
would result from reducing strength of patents via research exemption is difficult to determine, as is
determining whether recognition of research exemption would have different impact from other
reductions of patent strength such as reducing patent term). Ultimately the question reduces to an
empirical one. Id. at 1074.
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diminution of incentive occasioned by divesting a patent owner's injunctive
remedy may be compensated for by creating the opportunity for a
sufficiently generous after-the-fact monetary award. The adoption of a
reach-through royalty approach that correlates the level of ex post royalty
payments to the tool patent owner with the commercial value of the new
products developed by use of the patented tool would work to minimize the
disincentive effect.
207
B. Transformative Versus Commercial Purpose
An expanded experimental use doctrine is in keeping with the need for
"safety valves" in all areas of intellectual property law, and especially so in
view of the current climate of increasing "propertization" of intellectual
property.208 Existing safety valves that safeguard against intellectual
property rights of excessive scope include the reverse doctrine of
equivalents in patent law2°gand the fair use doctrines of the copyright2'and
trademark" laws.
The policies underlying the fair use doctrine of copyright law can readily
support an expanded experimental use doctrine in patent law. Statutorily
207. The proposed adoption ofreach-through royalties as the means for compensating the research
tool patentee is detailed infra notes 286-305 and accompanying text.
208. Lawrence Lessig, The Problem With Patents, INDUS. STANDARD (Apr. 23, 1999), available at
http://www.thestandard.com/arti,le/display/0,l151,4296,00.html (decrying "feeding frenzy" in
intellectual property law and asserting that Clinton administration was "obsessed" with intellectual
property rights).
209. The reverse doctrine of equivalents absolves an accused infringer from infringement liability
where the accused device, although literally falling within the scope of the asserted patent claim, is so
far changed in function, way, or result that a finding of liability cannot be justified as a policy matter.
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950); Westinghouse v.
Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898). Although the topic of favorable academic
attention, see Merges & Nelson, supra note 37, at 862-68 (advocating reverse doctrine of equivalents
as mechanism to limit patent scope in face of significant technological improvement by accused
infringer), the reverse doctrine of equivalents has rarely been applied by the courts to excuse liability.
Lemley, supra note 70, at 1011.
210. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (providing that fair use of copyrighted work is not infringement of
copyright). Unlike copyright law, patent law has not contemplated any fair use provision. The
traditional, narrow experimental use doctrine ofpatent law has been characterized as the closest patent
doctrine to copyright's fair use. Lemley, supra note 70, at 1038 n.236.
211. See 15 U.S.C. § II 15(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1998) (codifying "fair use" defense to trademark
infringement where defendant uses term "which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only
to describe" the defendant's goods or services or their geographic origin); J. THOM AS MCCARTHY, 2
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11.17 (4th ed. 1996) (explainingthat under
trademark fair use doctrine, junior user of descriptive term always remains free to use such term in its
"primary, descriptive sense," rather than in its source-indicating sense).
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enacted in the 1976 Copyright Act, the fair use doctrine provides that
certain socially beneficial uses of copyrighted works, such as for research,
criticism, and news reporting, are not copyright infringement.1 2
Recognition of the copyright fair use doctrine has been seen as necessary to
fully promote the constitutional goal of stimulating the production of new
copyrightable works." 3 As a means of lessening or alleviating the
restrictions on research and development that have been occasioned by the
patenting of research tools, an expanded experimental use doctrine would
likewise promote the constitutional goal of progress in the useful
(technological) arts.
The Commercial nature or profit motive of the accused infringer's use is
not fatal to enjoyment of the fair use defense in copyright law. In contrast
with the traditional narrow understanding of patent law's experimental use
doctrine, recent judicial interpretations have expanded the copyright fair
use doctrine to encompass unlicensed uses that are decidedly commercial
in nature. The U.S. Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc.214 made clear that commercial uses are not per se unfair
and thus infringing.
215
Rather than focusing on whether an accused infringer's unauthorized use
is commercial in its purpose, fair use in copyright law turns primarily on
the degree to which that use is "transformative" in nature.216 In contrast
with a use that would merely supercede or supplant the original work, a
transformative use is one that generally furthers the goals of copyright
212. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
213. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,575 (1994) (stating that opportunity for
some fair use of copyrighted materials seen as necessary to "fulfill copyright's very purpose, '[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.") (quoting U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8) (footnote
omitted). It should be noted that the Framers' use of the word "Science" in the quoted constitutional
clause referred to copyrightable subject matter, while "useful Arts" meant patentable subject matter. In
re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (Rich, J.).
214. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
215. Id. at 572 (reversing court of appeals holding that defense of fair use for rap parody of
copyrighted song was barred by parody's commercial character and excessive borrowing from
original). Compare Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)
(stating that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively ... unfair"), with
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584-85 (rejecting narrow interpretation of Sony as creating presumption of
unfair use arising from commerciality and recognizing that such presumption would "swallow nearly
all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of [1 7 U.S.C.] § 107, including news
reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities 'are generally
conducted for profit in this country") (quoting Harper & Row Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 592 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
216. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583-85,590-91.
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law.217 When the unauthorized use of another's copyrighted work results in
something that copyright law seeks to promote2  -i.e., "adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the [copyright
owner's work] with new expression, meaning, or message"219 the use is
more likely to be held a fair one and therefore outside the realm of
copyright infringement.
Judicial elevation of transformative character over commerciality in the
copyright regime can serve as a model for a similar treatment in patent law,
and particularly so with respect to the patent experimental use doctrine,
given its proximity to copyright fair use principles. 2 ' Another patent law
doctrine, the doctrine of equivalents, has already been the subject of a
transformative-use type of analysis, although not given that label.
Compelling arguments have been made that patent infringement
determinations under the doctrine of equivalents should take into
consideration the extent to which an accused infringement represents a
technological improvement over the patented invention.22' In other words,
the technological contribution made by the accused infringer should be part
of the calculus of patent infringement liability.2 2
Analysis of the accused infringer's contribution is particularly applicable
when it is not operating within the literal boundaries of the patentee's
claims, but rather is liable, if at all, under the more imprecise rubric of the
doctrine of equivalents.23 In such cases, the greater the extent of the
accused infringer's technological advance over the patented invention, the
217. Id. at 579.
218. Id. ("[T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the
creation of transformative works.").
219. Id.
220. The common law experimental use doctrine ofpatent law has been characterized as the closest
patent doctrine to copyright's fair use. See Lemley, supra note 70, at 1038 n.236.
221. Merges & Nelson, supra note 37, at 857-59 (citing with approval court's analysis in Texas
Instruments, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission, 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
that focused on "the merits of the accused device"); id. at 909-11 (advocating that after courts have
determined significance of patented invention they should also consider "importance of the advance
represented in the accused device").
222. The infringer's contribution could be relevant in determinations of equivalency under the
doctrine of equivalents, as well as in assessing whether the reverse doctrine of equivalents should be
applied to excuse a literal infringement that is so far changed in principle from the patented invention
that it is unfair to find liability. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 37, at 862-68 (advocating reverse
doctrine of equivalents as mechanism to limit patent scope in face of significant technological
improvement by accused infringer); id. at 867 & n. 120 (noting that same rationale applies to doctrine
of equivalents analysis and is perhaps even more useful there).
223. Id. at 867 n.120.
Vol. 76:1, 2001
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement
less likely that the differences between the claimed and accused devices are
merely "insubstantial ' 4 and therefore invoking application of the doctrine
of equivalents.' Indeed, the Federal Circuit has recognized that where an
accused infinger's product is itself patented, this fact may evidence that
the differences between the claimed and accused devices are beyond those
permissible for application of the doctrine of equivalents. 6
Professor Mark Lemley has proposed a patent law model in which the
class of "truly radical improvements" would be exempted from liability for
infringement,' 7 even if the improvement falls within the literal scope of the
patent claim at issue." s Such an exemption would create an incentive for
the creation of improvements and avoid the licensing transaction costs that
might otherwise prevent those improvements from reaching the
marketplace. 9 The same analysis can be extended to uses of research tools
that produce a commercial product not physically incorporating the
patented tool itself. Such products can be viewed as representing the
ultimate category of improvement within Professor Lemley's hierarchy, as
well as the epitome of transformative use in the copyright fair use sense.
C. Research Tool Patentability and Claim Scope
Broadened acceptance of the non-consensual use of patented research
tools might also be criticized as a makeshift solution to the more
fundamental problem of the issuance of biotechnological patent claims of
224. Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that
doctrine of equivalents applies at claim-limitation level ifonly "insubstantial differences" distinguish
claimed limitation from corresponding component of accused device); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v.
Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516-18 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (expressing test for application of
doctrine of equivalents in terms of whether differences between claimed and accused devices are
"insubstantial').
225. Merges & Nelson, supra note 37, at 867.
226. Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining in context of
doctrine of equivalents infringement analysis that "[t]he nonobviousness of the accused device,
evidenced by the grant of a United States patent, is relevant to the issue of whether the change therein
is substantial'); Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(characterizing fact of patentability of accused device as "relevant" and "entitled to due weight" in
infringement analysis, though not determinative); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co.,
750 F.2d 1569, 1580 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (suggesting that patentability ofaccused device based on
"unexpected results" over patentee's device might evidence non-equivalency based on substantially
different "result").
227. Lemley, supra note 70, at 1010-13, 1070.
228. When the "radical improvement" does fall within the literal boundaries of the claim, this
invokes the reverse doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 1010-11.
229. Id. at 1070.
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unjustified scope.23 But administrative and judicial actors are beginning to
respond to the scope problem. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) recently issued guidelines requiring a more rigorous showing of
utility as a prerequisite to patentability,231 and the Federal Circuit seems
more than willing to wield the enablement and written description
requirements of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 as claim scope-
shrinking implements.
32
Others contend outright that research tools should be completely
excluded from patenting.233 They argue that, rather than exempting
230. Cf Barton, supra note 15, at 449 (criticizing broad patents as potentially "usable to prevent
entry by others..." or to "affect the incentives for further research by others"); Merges & Nelson,
supra note 37, at 916 (concluding that "[w]hen a broad patent is granted or expanded via the doctrine
of equivalents, its scope diminishes incentives for others to stay in the invention game, compared again
with a patent whose claims are trimmed more closely to the inventor's actual results"); Rai,supra note
37, at 120-29 (criticizing "development-oriented perspective" of Edmund Kitch and others as
advocating broad patents on basic inventions as "prospects" to encourage further development of that
technology, coordinated by single rights holder).
231. See Examination Guidelines, supra note 61, at 71,441; see also Q. Todd Dickinson,
Reconciling Research and the Patent System, ISSUES Scr. & TECH., Summer 2000, at 69 (asserting that
USPTO is cognizant of concerns that patents on gene fragments "might retard basic research and that
these claims will form an intricate licensing web that will impede their use in developing cures for
diseases," and that USPTO "continue[s] to take steps to ensure that patent applications in these areas
are meticulously scrutinized for an adequate written description, sufficiency of the disclosure, and
enabled utilities").
232. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). Other recent examples of the Federal Circuit's application of the first
paragraph of § 112 in a restrictive fashion include Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming judgment of invalidity based on failure of patent directed to "highly
unpredictable" antisense technology to satisfy enablement requirement of § 112's first paragraph,
where claims at issue were "quite broad" and extent of experimentation required to practice invention
as claimed in all prokaryotic or eukaryotic cells would be undue in light of examples disclosing
successful performance of invention with only single prokaryotic cell, e. colt), and Genentech, Inc. v.
Novo Nordisk, AIS, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reversing preliminary injunction and
holding invalid for non-enablement patent directed to method of producing human growth hormone
through cleavable fusion expression that, in Federal Circuit's view, provided only "a direction for
further research"). E.g., Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description
Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615 (1998) (characterizing
Federal Circuit's decision in Regents ofthe University ofCalifornia v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559
(Fed. Cir. 1997), as having effectively elevated written description requirement of § 112's first
paragraph to "super enablement" standard, and having improperly applied written description
requirement to originally filed claims).
233. Public comments received by the USPTO in response to its first round of Interim Written
Description Guidelines, published in June 1998, asserted that "ESTs [Expressed Sequence Tags] are
genomic research tools that should be available for unencumbered research to advance the public
good." Examination Guidelines, supra note 61, at 71,441; see also McConathy & Weber, supra note
40, at 177 (expressing alarm of many in biotechnological community that exclusive rights in research
tools will preclude opportunities for development of products in long term, and arguing that research
tool inventions should not be patentable); cf Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion
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unauthorized research uses of patented research tools from infringement
liability, research tools would be better dealt with by excluding them from
patentability in the first instance.
But prohibiting the patenting of any particular technology or type of
invention is a draconian step that has generally been avoided in the United
States."4 To take away any possibility of any remedy, injunctive or
monetary, for unauthorized uses of all research tools could deleteriously
constrict incentives for the creation of new research tools.25 A complete
exclusion would also run afoul of the developmental history of U.S. patent
jurisprudence, which traditionally has taken an expansive stance toward
patentable subject matter. 6 Exclusion of particular technologies from
patentability also contravenes U.S. treaty obligations under the non-
discrimination provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) Uruguay Round Agreements, Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 7
LetterAs To the Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated With the Identification ofPartalcDNA
Sequences, 23 AIPLA QJ. 1, 19 (1995) (contending that "[t]here are reasons to be wary of patents on
research tools, including concerns that they might be licensed on an exclusive basis to the detriment of
subsequent research").
234. Even though the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Chakrabary, 447 U.S. 303
(1980), affirmed the patentability of living, genetically engineered subject matter, life patenting
continues to be the subject of robust public debate and vocal criticism twenty years later. E.g., Council
for Responsible Genetics, No Patents on Life!, available at http://www.gene-wateh.orgpetition.html
(last visited May 30,2000). Congress in the intervening time period has not amended the patent laws to
exclude living subject matter or genetically engineered subject matter from patenting.
The only technology-specific subject matter exclusions from patenting currently recognized in U.S.
law involve inventions directed to national security and nuclear technology. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (Supp. IV
1998) (authorizing withholding of patent grants on inventions "detrimental to the national security");
42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (Supp. IV 1998) ("No patent shall hereafter be granted for any invention or
discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an
atomic weapon.").
235. Eisenberg&Mergessupranote233, at 19 (recognizing that to withholdpatent protection from
research tools would undermine their creation and distribution, particularly with respect to tools
developed by private-sector firms).
236. E.g., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-10 (holding that live, genetically engineered bacterium is
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101); State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that data-processing system for administering mutual fund
of "hub and spoke" configuration is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
237. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Uruguay Round Agreements, Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Art. 27(l) (1994) (providing that, subject to limited
exceptions, "patents shall be available for any inventions, whetherproducts orprocesses, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application').
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Reliance interests of patent owners and innovators who rely on the
possibility of patent protection would also be threatened by excluding
research tools from patentability. Numerous patents have already been
granted on research tools.2 38 In view of the current industry practice of
patenting to the greatest extent possible, any proposal for the outfight
prohibition of patents on research tools appears destined for failure.
Lastly, the issuance of patents on research tools results in social benefits
as well as costs. Publication of enabling descriptions of how to make and
use new research tools increases the store of public knowledge, despite the
"royalty stacking" problem that may arise when development of
commercial products demands multiple authorizations to practice several
different research tool patents. As the USPTO's Director has contended,
"the need for a possible research tool exemption.., should not drive a
narrowing of subject matter in order to create.., a de facto patenting
exception. ' The patenting of research tools should not be barred.
D. Constitutional Implications
A broadened experimental use exemption arguably might ran counter to
a textualist interpretation of the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.2 0 The core of U.S. patent law, absent in many foreign
regimes,24 is Congress's constitutional power to promote the progress of
the useful arts in a manner that the Framers in 1787 spelled out with an
unusual degree of particularity242 by securing to inventors, for limited
238. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text for examples. An on-line search of the LEXIS
U.S. Utility Patents database (which includes patents issued from 1971 through the present) conducted
on June 6, 2000 for patents having the phrase "research tool" in the "Summary of the Invention"
section retrieved 666 hits.
239. Dickinson, supra note 230, at 70.
240. See U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."). The quoted constitutional text serves a dual purpose by
establishing the basis of both copyright and patent law in the United States. The Framers' use of the
word "Science" is believed to refer to copyrightable subject matter, while "useful Arts" is thought to
mean "technological arts" or patentable subject matter. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952,958-59 (C.C.P.A.
1979) (Rich, J.).
241. In many foreign countries, the existence of a patent system is viewed as a limited exception to a
general prohibition against monopolies. E.g., PENROSE, supra note 117, at 7 (describing Statute of
Monopolies of 1623 as basis of present British patent law); Edwin S. Flores Troy, The Development of
Modern Frameworks for Patent Protection: Mexico, a Modelfor Reform, 6 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
133, 137 (1998) (describing Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 as prohibiting all
monopolies except those that "serve the nation," including privileges granted to inventors and authors).
242. No other enumerated power is spelled out in such detail. See U.S. CONST., art. 1.
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times, the "exclusive right" to their discoveries.243 As expressed in the
Patent Act, the "exclusive right" is now understood as the patentee's "right
to exclude" all others from making, using, or selling (and more recently,
offering to sell and importing) the patented invention.2'
The Framers' use of the modifier "exclusive" to describe the right that
Congress was authorized to secure to inventors probably does not create a
Constitutional barrier to modification of that right, however. To conclude
otherwise would require ignoring the instances in which Congress or the
courts have already recognized exceptions to patent exclusivity. 4
Moreover, a strict textualist interpretation of the Intellectual Property
Clause is of minimal use given the Clause's expansive terms and lack of
"built-in limits."2" The Intellectual Property Clause is probably best
understood as giving Congress thepower to grant exclusive rights, but not
requiring that it do so.24 7 Thus, Congress has the power to grant less-than-
exclusive patent rights. A broadened experimental use defense would not
run afoul of the Constitution.
E. Conventional U.S. Norms ofPatent Exclusivity
Re-conceptualizing the experimental use exemption will require a
decided change in the culture of the American patent system. The tradition
of sharing scientific information is the hallmark of the communalistic
243. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
244. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(l) (1994) ("Everypatent shall contain... agrant tothepatentee ... ofthe
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States or importing the invention into the United States... ?") (emphasis added); Bloomer v.
McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539,548-49 (1852) ("The franchise which the patent grants, consists
altogether in the right to exclude every one from making, using, or vending the thingpatented, without
the permission of the patentee.").
245. See infra notes 253, 256-67 and accompanying text
246. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEYTECH. LJ. 577,584 (1999) (finding"little
hope" for "originalist interpretation" of Intellectual Property Clause as meaningful indicator of any
limits on patentable subject matter).
247. Cf.NIMMERONCOPYRIGHT § 1.07(1999). Professor Nimmer asserts that with respect to U.S.
copyright law:
Inasmuch as Congress manifestly has the power either to grant complete exclusivity or no
protection at all, it would seem that it may properly invoke protection somewhere between these
two polar positions. Nonexclusivity under a compulsory license appears to constitute such a
reasonable middle ground. It may then be concluded that the phrase 'the exclusive right' imports
words of authority, but not oflimitation.
Id.
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nature of science.248 This tradition would be greatly facilitated with less
restricted access to patented research tools. On the other hand, expanding
the doctrine clearly contravenes historical norms of expansive patent rights
and traditionally fierce antipathy by the U.S. patent-holding community
toward incursions on exclusivity.
The experimental use exemption is a decidedly unappealing notion to
advocates of the view that the exclusionary power of a U.S. patent bestows
its owner with broad-ranging control over future technology. This view is
grounded in the well-established rule that the owner of a U.S. patent on a
"basic" or "pioneer" invention may enjoin a follow-on developer from
using the improvement invention, even if the improvement invention is
independently patentable over the basic invention.249 The basic patent
"dominates" the improvement patent, so long as the claims of the basic
patent are interpreted broadly enough to read on the improvement. The
existence of "dominant" and "subservient" patents flows from the fact that
a U.S. patent grants its owner a negative exclusionary right to prohibit
others from using the patented invention, rather than bestowing on the
patentee an affirmative right to use the invention."
The doctrine of equivalents also fosters the U.S. norm of patents as
broad property rights relatively immune from incursions. New technology
developed after the issuance of a particular patent, in an effort to improve
on or even design around the patented invention, may still infringe that
patent under the doctrine of equivalents, even if it does not fall within the
literal boundaries of the patentee's exclusionary right as defined by the
patent's claims. 21 The doctrine of equivalents in essence creates a
penumbra of exclusionary power around the explicit boundaries specified
in the patent instrument, and its extent is determinable only through
litigation to enforce the patent. Notably, the fact that the infringed patent
248. Cf Rai, supra note 37, at 89-90 (defining "communalism norm" of U.S. scientific community
as one that views scientific information as "shared resource" and promotes "public domain of freely
available scientific information").
249. See Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 221 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Richardson v. Suzuki
Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226,1240 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Atlas PowderCo. v. E.I. DuPontdeNemours &Co.,
750 F.2d 1569, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
250. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994) (defining patent grant as "the right to exclude others'). Thus,
the holder of the improvement patent does not obtain from the patent any affirmative right to practice
the improvement invention, even though it is patented.
251. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997) (rejecting
argument that doctrine of equivalents should not extend to "after-arising equivalents').
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did not (and could not) disclose nor factually enable others to make and use
the after-arising accused equivalent is not fatal to the patentee's claim.
252
When viewed from this doctrinal and historical perspective, the U.S.
patent community's reticence to embrace a meaningful experimental use
doctrine is entirely understandable. At least until recently, the far-reaching
exclusionary power of the patent property right was sacrosanct. Absent
very limited exceptions,' the patentee's right to exclude was not burdened
by governmental intrusion. Courts reacted negatively to any limitations on
enforcement rights.2 At the behest of patent owners and patent bar groups,
U.S. legislators have traditionally rejected derogations of the patentee's
252. The basic patent need only comply with the enablement requirement in the first paragraph of
35 U.S.C. § 112 insofar as the claimed invention was understood as of its patent application filing date;
it need not enable the later-developed infringing device. United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum
Corp., 865 F.2d 1247, 1250-52 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605-07 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
253. Historically, only a small number of exceptions were recognized to the general rule against
derogations of a patent's exclusivity. For example, the federal government retains the powerto use any
patented invention but must pay just compensation for the taking if infringement is proved. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 (1994).
Since the enactment ofthe Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, the federal government has retained a "march-in"
right to require that the patentee grant licenses under the patent to third party applicants where the
small business firm or nonprofit entity having title in the patent has failed to achieve sufficient
practical application of the subject invention. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (1994). Although the federal
government's "march-in" right has been on the books since 1980, it has never been exercised. See
Gerth & Stolberg, supra note 166, at 1, 20; see also Eliot Marshall, NIH Nixes Appeal To Bypass
PatentLaw, 277 SCIENCE 759,759-60 (1997) (reporting NIH Director Harold Varmus's decision not
to exercise "march-in" rights under Bayh-Dole Act in dispute between patentee Johns Hopkins
University and accused infringer CellPro, Inc., rejecting CellPro's contention that Hopkins' exclusive
licensee Baxter Healthcare Corporation had delayed in commercializing patented technology directed
to use of CD34 antibodies to separate stem cells from human blood or bone marrow).
Compulsory licensing is permitted under the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (Supp. IV 1998)
(authorizing governmental grant to applicants of non-exclusive licenses under patents declared to be
"affected with the public interest" because of "primary importance in the production or utilization of
special nuclear material or atomic energy"), and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (Supp. IV 1998)
(authorizing federal district courts to order licensing of air pollution prevention and control patents "on
such reasonable terms and conditions as the court, after hearing, may determine," where unavailability
of such licenses might result in "substantial lessening of competition" or "tendency to create a
monopoly").
Compulsory licensing has also been ordered as a remedy for antitrust or patent misuse violations in
several cases. SeegenerallyJAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.03[2][d]
(2000).
254. E.g., Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573,1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Without the
right to obtain an injunction, the right to exclude granted to the patentee would have only a fraction of
the value it was intended to have, and would no longer be as great an incentive to engage in the toils of
scientific and technological research.").
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right to exclude that are widely recognized in foreign systems, such as
compulsory licensing, working requirements, and prior-user rights.
255
More recently, however, fundamental changes in U.S. patent law have
begun to foster an increasingly hospitable environment for acceptance of a
broader experimental use doctrine. Congressional, executive, and judicial
actors are implementing a number of significant incursions into patent
exclusivity. As described previously, Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman
Act in 1984, adding to the Patent Act § 271(e)'s safe harbor for testing of
patented drugs and medical devices for purposes reasonably related to
regulatory data gathering.2 6 In 1996, Congress enacted the remedies
limitation found in § 287(c) of the Patent Act, which precludes the owner
of a patent directed to a "medical procedure" from enjoining or obtaining
damages from an infringer of that patent.257 By passage of the American
Inventors Protection Act of 1999,258 the United States has for the first time
a limited form of prior-user rights, 259 which have long been recognized in
Europe and Japan.260 Over the protests of American pharmaceutical
manufacturers, President Clinton in May 2000 issued an Executive Order
255. E.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (describing
compulsory licensing as "rarity" in U.S. patent system); see also PENROSE, supra note 117, at 172
(explaining that compulsory licensing has been "violently opposed" in United States because it "can be
such a serious derogation of the monopoly 'rights' of the patentee"); F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 456 (1970) ("[E]very attempt to alter the U.S. law
in this direction (of introducing general compulsory licensing provisions] has been beaten down as a
result of determined opposition from industrial groups and the patent bar.'); Feit, supra note 26, at 840
n. 102 (characterizing U.S. policy as "not favoring compulsory licenses.'); McConathy & Weber, supra
note 40, at 178 (describing compulsory licensing as "abhorrent to both academia and industry");
Merges & Nelson,supra note 37, at 911 (describing compulsory licensing as "anathema" to U.S. patent
law).
Congress considered but ultimately dropped the idea of compulsory licensing as part of the 1952
Patent Act. Dawson, 448 U.S. at 215 n.21.
256. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
257. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
258. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536,1536 (1999)
(codified as amended in 35 U.S.C. § 273 under the title "Defense to Infringement Based on Earlier
Inventor").
259. In general terms, a prior-user right permits one who, prior to the filing ofthe patent in suit, had
independently invented the same subject matter, to continue making, using, or selling it at pre-suit
levels. A prior-user right is in essence a license to continue practicing the invention subsequently
patented by another.
260. Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 701-04 (1890) (enjoining importation ofproduct covered by
U.S. patent and acquired abroad from authorized German source with prior-user rights); see also Lisa
M. Brownlee, Trade Secret Use of Patentable Inventions, Prior User Rights and Patent Law
Harmonization: An Analysis and Proposal, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 523,535-40 (1990)
(collecting prior-user right provisions of patent laws of Japan, England, Germany, and France).
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providing that the U.S. government will not challenge those sub-Saharan
African governments that grant compulsory licenses under pharmaceutical
patents on HI V/AIDS drugs or permit parallel imports of these drugs from
other countries where they are available at lower prices.261 And in
November 2000, the Federal Circuit sitting en banc announced in Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.262 stringent new rules of
prosecution history estoppel that significantly contract the ability of patent
owners to rely on the doctrine of equivalents.263
Perhaps the most significant recent incursion into patent exclusivity
occurred in 1999 when the U.S. Supreme Court held in Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank26 that
Congress's 1992 abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity from patent
infringement liability for states, instrumentalities of states, and state
employees acting in their official capacity was unconstitutional.265 As a
result of College Savings Bank, state universities are immune from patent
infringement liability under the federal patent laws.
The potential ramifications of the College Savings Bank decision are
quite troubling in at least two respects. First, the state courts may begin to
261. Exec. OrderNo. 13155, Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals andMedical Technologies, 65
Fed. Reg. 30,521 (May 10, 2000); Neil A. Lewis, Clinton TriesTo Expedite AIDSDrugs into Africa,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2000, at A7; Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Companies To Cut Cost ofAIDSDrugsfor
Poor Nations, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,2000, at A12.
262. 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc).
263. Id. at 569 (holding that when amendment of claim creates prosecution history, no range of
equivalents is available for amended claim limitation).
264. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
265. As a general rule, state governments are immune from lawsuits underthe Eleventh Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that the "Judicial Power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any foreign state." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI. In 1992, Congress stripped the states oftheir immunity for patent infringement by enacting
the Patent Remedy Act. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub.L. No. 102-
560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994)).
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress cannot
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity under Congress's Article I powers.
Seminole Tribe thus foreclosed reliance on congressional authority under either the Commerce Clause
or the Intellectual Property Clause to sustain the Patent Remedy Act. In College Savings Bank, the
argument for constitutionality of the Patent Remedy Act was accordingly premised on the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 527 U.S. at 636. The petitioner contended that patents are
private property and to allow states to use them without authorization and without remedy was a
deprivation of private property without due process. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Due
Process theory on the grounds that there had not been a sufficient showing that state governments
routinely infringe, that such infringement is willful rather than merely negligent or "innocent," or that
such infringement results in a property deprivation without due process. Id. at 639-46. In support of its
ruling, the Court pointed to the possibility of alternative remedies in state court such as unfair
competition causes of action. Id. at 643-44 & nn.8-9.
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hear patent infringement cases brought under the guise of state unfair
competition actions. State court activity in this arena is contrary to federal
preemption principles of patent law and the federal nature of patent rights
as recognized in U.S. law since 1790. Placing quasi-patent jurisdiction in
the state courts is also antithetical to the "national uniformity" rationale
underlying the Federal Circuit's formation.26
Second, College Savings Bank may have an unforeseen impact on the
formation, arrangement, and management of research and development
collaborations between state universities and private industry. Private-
sector partners will presumably seek to maximize their opportunities to be
shielded from liability under the state universities' umbrella of immunity.
However, the minimum level of state funding or control or both that would
render a state university-industry collaboration eligible for the immunity as
an instrumentality of the state is yet unknown. Moreover, state universities
may balk at the potential negative impact on their academic independence
with good reason. Research agendas ought not to be controlled by funding
manipulations for the purpose of helping industry collaborators gain the
protections of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The College Savings Bank holding is especially significant to the debate
over access to patented research tools insofar as state universities and their
industry collaborators may be frequent users of these tools. Because
College Savings Bank gives states immunity from patent infringement
liability under Title 35, state university research would appear to have no
immediate need for a broadened experimental use doctrine as proposed
here.267 Yet as frequent users of patented research tools, the state university
is a critical participant in the debate over a broadened exemption.
VII. A PROPOSED "DEVELOPMENT USE" MODEL
This Part reviews a previous proposal for expanding the experimental
use doctrine and concludes that further modifications are needed for the
case of patented research tools. It proposes a "liability rule" model that
would permit the non-consensual "development use" of patented research
tools that are not readily available for licensing or purchase, while
providing an ex post royalty payment to the owner of the patented research
266. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (creating U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (Supp. IV 1998) (providing that Federal
Circuit has exclusive nationwide jurisdiction over patent appeals).
267. Exceptions would include state and industry collaborations that are not sufficiently
"instrumentalities ofthe state" to qualify for Eleventh Amendment immunity and state officials acting
in the scope oftheir official capacity who may still be subject to prospective injunctive reliefunder Ex
Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167-68 (1908).
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tool of sufficient amount to maintain adequate incentives for innovation in
new tools. The proposed "reach-through" royalty approach, as it is referred
to in consensual biotech licensing transactions, would compute the royalty
payment to the tool patent owner based on the marketplace value of the
new products or diagnostics developed through use of the patented research
tool.
In her seminal 1989 article, Professor Rebecca Eisenberg proposed a
three-pronged model for an expanded experimental use doctrine.2" First,
Professor Eisenberg contended that use of a patented invention to verify
that the patent's written description and drawings adequately enabled the
claimed invention should be altogether exempt from infringement
liability.269 This aspect of Professor Eisenberg's proposal is probably
closest to Justice Story's view that the construction of a patented machine
"for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce
its described effects '27 is not infringement. Such use is also most likely to
fall within the current post-Roche "truly narrow" view of the experimental
use defense as limited to "non-commercial" uses.27'
Second, Professor Eisenberg argued that use of an invention having a
"primary or significant market" among research users who are "ordinary
consumers" of the invention should not be exempt from liability; in
Professor Eisenberg's view, these "consumers" must obtain a license prior
to their use. 2 For example, in a scenario where users of patented
transgenic mice as tools for conducting cancer research represent the target
market of the mouse patent holder, it is reasonable to assume that the
patentee will want to make the mouse widely available at reasonable
licensing terms. These "ordinary consumers," as Professor Eisenberg's use
of that term suggests, do not face access problems if they can readily
license or buy the research tool on the open market.273
Third, Professor Eisenberg proposed that those who use a patented
invention in a manner that leads to improvements in the technological field
of that patent, or for the purpose of "designing around" the patent's claims
to avoid infringement, should not have to negotiate for a license prior to
268. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress ofScience: Exclusive Rights andExperimental
Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1074-78 (1989).
269. Id. at 1078 ("Research use of a patented invention to check the adequacy of the specification
and the validity of the patent holder's claims about the invention should be exempt from infringement
liability:).
270. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
271. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
272. Eisenberg, supra note 268, at 1078.
273. Id. at 1085 (suggesting that patentee "will want to sell to these users-they fall squarely within
the market for the patented invention").
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their use.274 Such users would still be considered infringers in Professor
Eisenberg's model but would enjoy a remedies limitation. The patent
owner would not be able to enjoin their uses, but "in some cases" would
receive an after-the-fact "reasonable royalty" in recognition of the patent
owner's initial investment in developing the patented invention.275
Professor Eisenberg did not identify criteria for choosing among those
patent owners for whom the royalty remedy should be available, nor a
method for quantifying its amount.
The third "improver" prong of Professor Eisenberg's proposed
framework can be viewed as a variation on compulsory licensing,276
without the necessity of first petitioning the patentee or the government for
a license.277 The limitation of the patentee's remedy to a royalty rather than
274. Id. (citing example of researchers attempting to design improved transgenic mouse or non-
infringing transgenic mouse).
275. Id. at 1078.
276. See Rai, supra note 37, at 139 (noting that system under which users pay reasonable royalties
to patent owner after unlicensed use is "not very different from a compulsory license scheme").
Professor Scherer has defined "compulsory licensing," which he also refers to as "mandatory
licensing," as the act of "waiving a patent holder's normally exclusive right to his invention under
specified conditions such as nonutilization of the invention, monopolistic abuses, or other
circumstances engendering a public interest in wider availability." F.M. Scherer, The Economic Effects
ofCompulsoryPatentLicensing5 in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY'S MONOGRAPH SERIES IN FINANCEAND
ECONOMICS (1977).
277. Edith Tilton Penrose has described the most extreme form of such a system as "unconditional
compulsory licensing," under which a license would be available as of right to any requestor without
the need for petitioning a governmental agency or establishing the patentee's failure to supply the
domestic market with the patented invention or license on reasonable terms. See PENROSE, supra note
117, at 184 (contending that if unconditional compulsory licensing were adopted "the worst of the
social costs of the patent system would be abolished at one stroke," but also noting traditional fears
that such system would abolish social gains from patenting because royalty remedy alone might be
insufficient to motivate desired level of innovation).
Yet another variation on unconditional compulsory licensing, available in the United Kingdom and
Germany, is a scheme under which a patentee may voluntarily request that the government make
licenses available to all comers upon payment of a reasonable royalty. In exchange for the patentee's
agreement to license without restriction, it obtains reduced maintenance fees over the life of the patent.
See id. at 177-78 & 177 n.29; German Patent Act of 16 December 1980, § 23(1) (reducing
maintenance fees by one halfprescribed amounts after patentee files written declaration ofwillingness
to allow anyone to practice patented invention in return for reasonable compensation), reprinted in 2D
SINNOTT ET AL., supra note 187, at WEST GERMANY-78.24.
A system of compulsory licensing without satisfaction of any threshold conditions would likely not
comply with current international patent agreements. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, art. 31,33 I.L.M. 81,95 (GAIT
Uruguay Round Agreements) (permitting use without authorization of rights holder only if "prior to
such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the rights holder on
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a
reasonable period of time"); Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
art. 5.A.4, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, 123 (Stockholm 1967 rev.) (permitting compulsory licenses to be applied
for in cases ofpatentee's "failure to work" or "insufficient working" of patent, after later of four years
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an injunction also illustrates the choice of a "liability rule" over a "property
rule."278
The royalty stacking problem in biotechnology, occasioned by
increasing need for patented tools that are not freely available for purchase
by ordinary consumers in the marketplace, has escalated in severity since
the 1989 publication of Professor Eisenberg's article. 79 In the current
environment, the assumption inherent in Professor Eisenberg's second
prong that research tools are readily available to "ordinary users" with
minimal transactions costs is increasingly less certain. Moreover,
innovation in one technology increasingly involves the use of patented
research tools from other technologies. For example, a genetically modified
mouse may be used to develop and screen new pharmaceuticals for the
treatment of cancer in humans, or a DNA chip (formed by layering chains
of nucleotides onto silicon) may be used to determine the link between
specific single nucleotide polymorphisms (genetic variations) and
particular diseases,280 leading to new screening techniques for these
diseases. To the extent that they are not improving the technology of the
research tool patent itself (i.e., resulting in improved research tools of the
same type), these trans-technologic uses of research tools would appear to
fall outside the third, "improver" prong of Professor Eisenberg's model."'
Yet such uses of research tools result in valuable new products that are just
from filing or three years from grant, but mandating refusal of request for compulsory license if
"patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons!).
278. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate
Coasean Trade, 104 YALE LJ. 1027, 1036-37 (1995) (contrasting "property rules" that protect legal
entitlements against all non-consensual takings with "liability rules" that permit non-consensual
takings but compensate entitlement holders). A framework for the setting and protection of
entitlements under "property rules" and "liability rules" was first proposed in Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, LiabilityRules and Inalienability: One View ofthe Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). In the patent context the right to an injunction against infringement
represents a property rule, while compulsory licensing of patented inventions represents a liability rule.
Ayres & Talley, supra, at 103 6-37. In the context ofa patented improvement invention that is blocked
by a dominant patent, Ayres and Talley contend that liability rules are preferable to property rules. Id.
Liability rules would facilitate revelation of information which, when it is otherwise not disclosed in
cross-licensing negotiations, would lead to significant delay if not complete breakdown of those
negotiations. Id. at 1092-93. Ayres and Talley's implementation of a liability rule in the patent setting
accordingly contemplates a compulsory licensing scheme that would "giv[e] the improver an option to
infringe the pioneer's patent in exchange for a fee determined by a licensing tribunal." Id. at 1093.
279. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text; see also Marshall, supra note 57, at 25
(describing debate over restrictions on research use of cre-loxP mouse as 'just the latest skirmish in a
decade-long battle over commercial controls on basic tools in biomedical research").
280. Nicholas Wade, Where Computers andBlology Meet: Making a DNA Chip, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
8, 1997, at C1.
281. See Eisenberg, supra note 268, at 1078 (limiting proposed reasonable royalty limitation to "use
of a patented invention in subsequent research in the field of the invention!).
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as important, if not more so, from a societal benefit standpoint. 21 2
This Article proposes to extend and adapt Professor Eisenberg's model
to the current research tool milieu so as to permit non-consensual use of
research tools not readily available for licensing on reasonable terms or via
anonymous marketplace purchase.283 This "development use" rule284 would
not discriminate against research tool users who seek to develop
commercial products. It would be limited to "uses" of research tools as
tools, however, and would not encompass the sale of products by the tool
user that physically incorporate the patented invention. This latter scenario
involves liability for "selling" the patented invention under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a),285 which should not be exempted from injunctive or damages
remedies.
This Article further proposes the adoption of a reach-through royalty
structure that would link the royalty payment with the ultimate commercial
value of the products developed from use of the patented research tool. The
new products would serve as the royalty base.286 In this manner the royalty
payment to the research tool patentee would approximate the true value of
the research tool to the tool user and product developer. Such an approach
would also work to minimize the disincentive effect on innovation in
research tools. The research tool patent owner would acquire the right to a
potentially commercially significant future royalty stream, while the tool
user would avoid the burdens of pre-use license negotiations, up-front
payments, and blocked access to the proprietary research tools.
To ensure adequate notice to the research tool patentee in the proposed
model, the putative user would be required to notify the patentee in writing
of the user's intent to use the patented research tool, prior to the use. In
contrast with typical consensual licensing negotiations for use of research
282. See Barton, supra note 15, at 457.
283. The limitation ofthe proposed development use rule to situations where the research tool is not
readily accessible through licensing or purchase in the marketplace is in keeping with the "failure of
private bargaining" restriction on compulsory licensing under GATT TRIPS. Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, art. 31, 33
I.L.M. 81,95 (providing that compulsory licensing shall be available only after "the proposed user has
made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and
conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time").
284. The phrase "development use" is employed in this Article to explicitly encompass those uses of
research tools that lead to commercialization of products, and to make clear that the experimental use
doctrine should no longer be limited to the purely "philosophical" (in the Roche sense) research
component of "research and development."
285. "Except as otherwise p.ovided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a)
(Supp. IV 1998) (emphasis added).
286. Reach-through royalties are discussed in supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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tools,2"7 however, no disclosure of the nature or details of the use would be
required. This minimal declaration of an "intent to use" will place the
patentee sufficiently on notice so that it can police any subsequent
introduction of new products into the marketplace by the tool user. The
patentee's detection ability can be supplemented by requiring that the tool
user additionally provide written notice of the new products at or shortly
before sales are commenced.28 Tool users who choose to opt out and not
give proper notices could be made subject to treble damages if
infringement is ultimately established.
Whether the utilization of a reach-through royalty approach triggers
patent misuse or antitrust concerns has been the subject of some debate in
the consensual (i.e., non-compulsory) licensing of biotechnological
research tools. 9 Advocates of reach-through royalties contend that patent
misuse does not occur if the reach-through royalty results from a bargained,
arms-length licensing transaction.290 The reach-through approach is seen as
an expedient method of measuring the value of the use of the research tool
rather than an unlawful leverage of the patent right.291 This treatment of
reach-through royalties is consistent with the Federal Circuit's approval of
a license agreement in which the royalty base encompassed not just the
287. See McConathy & Weber, supra note 40, at 178 (characterizing conventional reach-through
licenses for research tools as requiring "full disclosure" of licensee's intended use).
288. Germany's patent code provides a somewhat analogous notice framework, but requires
disclosure of the nature of the licensee's use. Owners of German patents have the option of filing a
written declaration with the German Patent Office stating their willingness to allow anyone to practice
the patented invention in return for reasonable compensation; the patent owner's maintenance fees are
thereafter reduced by half. German Patent Act of 16 December 1980, § 23 (1), reprinted in 2D S iNNoTr
ET AL., supra note 187, at WEST GERMANY-78.24. Following the recording of the patentee's
declaration, any individual wishing to exploit the invention may do so by notifying the patentee of his
or her intent. Id. at § 23(3). The notification must include a statement "of how the invention is to be
exploited" Id. The notifying party is then entitled to practice the invention in the manner stated. Id.
The notifying party must also provide the patentee with quarterly reports of the "particulars of the use"
and pay compensation for the use, which is assessed by the Patent Division. Id.
289. NIH Principles and Guidelines, supra note 26, at 72,091 (criticizing reach-through royalties);
David S. Block & Daniel J. Curran, Patenting Genomic Technologies, 282 SCIENCE 1419 (1998)
(denying, in letter responding to Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 698, that DuPont's reach-
through royalty agreement on patented cre-loxP mice allows DuPont to "leverage its proprietary
position inupstream research tools into a broad veto right over downstream research and development
products").
290. Barton, supra note 15, at 461 (asserting that "if [reach-through royalties] are reasonable, they
should be permitted and... insistence on such terms should not be read as an antitrust violation");
Goldstein,supra note 76; Robert Blackburn, Chief Patent Counsel, Chiron Corporation, remarks at the
National Academies Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy's Conference on
"Intellectual Property Rights: How Far Should They Be Extended?" (Internet broadcast, Feb. 3, 2000).
291. DRATLER, supra note 253, § 4.03 (asserting that "a royalty base that extends beyond the scope
of patent protection is lawful if accepted by both parties for their mutual convenience, for example, in
calculating royalties and avoiding disputes").
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patented device but also unpatented components used in practice of the
patented invention.292 The court characterized the inclusion of unpatented
subject matter in the royalty base as merely a "convenient means for
measuring the value of the license., 293
Recent liberalization of the Federal Circuit's damages jurisprudence
provides additional support for the legitimacy of a reach-through royalty
approach. The court has expanded traditional notions of recoverable
damages in patent infringement cases to encompass virtually any type of
economic harm that was "reasonably foreseeable" from the infringement.29
For example, damages may now be based on sales of infringing devices
that do not directly compete in the marketplace with the patentee's patented
product, 295 and lost profits may be awarded even when the patentee does
not manufacture the patented device at all.296 Where the patented device is
part of a larger system that also includes unpatented components, the
"entire market value" rule recognizes that the damages award can be
properly based on the value of the overall system.2 97 The Federal Circuit
has specifically rejected arguments that its expansion of recoverable
292. Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (approving license
agreement in which royalty base included both claimed system for connecting ends of sheet metal duct
sections and corner connectors not covered by patent) (citing Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950), overruled on other grounds by Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653,671
(1969); and Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 138 (1969)). The Federal
Circuit stressed the "voluntariness" of the license provision, and the fact that the licensee was not
required to (and in fact did not) purchase the unpatented connectors from the patentee. See id. at 1408-
09.
293. Id. at 1408 (agreeing with magistrate judge that "royalties may be based on unpatented
components if that provides a convenient means for measuring the value of the license"); see also
Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that although
compensatory damages based on "reasonable royalty" under 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) are "ordinarily
computed based upon the sales of a patented product or process ... parties may choose other methods
to compute the amount that a licensee may pay for the right to use a patented product or process, such
as flat fees or milestone payments in the case of pre-commercialization licenses').
294. King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 72 F.3d 855, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting from
denial of panel rehearing) (unpublished disposition) (characterizing 1995 Federal Circuit majority
decision in Rite-Hite as having "expanded legal injury for patent infringement" and worked
"fundamental change in patent rights'); see also Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelly Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that "[i]fa particular injury was or should have been reasonably
foreseeable by an infringing competitor in a relevant market, broadly defined, that injury is generally
compensable absent a persuasive reason to the contrary').
295. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549 (affirming award of lost profits damages based on lost sales of
patentee's ADL-100 vehicle-restraint device, which was not covered by patent in suit but directly
competed with defendant's infringing "Truk Stop" device).
296. King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 947 (Fed Cir. 1995).
297. Id. at 950-51 n.4 (characterizing entire market value rule as recognizing that "the economic
value of a patent may be greater than the value of the sales of the patented part alone," and therefore
permitting recovery based on value of unpatented as well as patented components of patentee's
product).
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infringement damages facilitates patent owners' restriction of competition
in unpatented products; rather, the court's stated objective is that "the
patentee be made whole. 298
The propriety of reach-through royalties is most problematic from a
patent-misuse standpoint when the royalty payments extend beyond the
enforceable life of the patent on the underlying research tool.2 This will
likely occur with relative frequency in biotechnology, where long-term
research and development projects (and regulatory approval of their results)
often result in the marketplace introduction of a new product lagging
several years behind the actual use of the patented research tools that led to
the product's development.
Rather than improper leveraging of the patent right, a better way to
approach the use of reach-through royalties is simply as a time-shifting
mechanism. Reach-through royalty payments continuing beyond the
expiration date of an underlying research tool patent more accurately
recognize the value of the patented research tool, which cannot be
definitively established during the enforceable life of the patent."° The
premise underlying reach-through royalties is that the true value of the
patented research tool will be determined by the ultimate marketplace
298. Rite-Hite, 56F.3d at 1547 (explaining that court's decision "simply asks, once infringement of
a valid patent is found, what compensable injuries result from that infringement, i.e., how may the
patentee be made whole").
299. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29,31-32 (1964) (holding that license agreementrequiring
farmers to make royalty payments after expiration date ofpatent on hop-picking machine was unlawful
per se where payments were for farmers' use of machine during post-expiration period, not "deferred
payments for use during the pre-expiration period").
300. Cf Harold See & Frank M. Caprio, The Trouble with Brulotte: The Patent Royalty Term and
Patent MonopolyExtension, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 813 (1990). See and Caprio contend thatBrulotte was
incorrectly decided. fL at 814. Licensees can be assumed to understand that a patentee's right to
exclude ends at the date of patent expiration. Id. Therefore, when licensees agree to make royalty
payments beyond that date, "the parties base those payments on the licensees' assessment of the value
of the license during the patent period. These payments, therefore, do not represent an extension in
time of the patent monopoly." Id.; see also Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality ofthe Patent
Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1630 (1990) (disagreeing with proposition that licensing
practices which extend royalty payments beyond enforceable life of patent are per se patent misuse,
and asserting that "[a] licensee will pay a fixed amount for a license, and the courts should not care
whether the licensee pays that amount up front, in ten years, or in a hundred years").
See and Caprio also dispute the Brulotte Court's negative view of post-expiration royalty payments
to the extent that such payments are perceived as unfairly imposing on the licensee a financial burden
not shared by the licensor. See & Caprio, supra at 848 (noting concern that "[a]rguably, upon
expiration of the patent, the royalty obligation impairs the licensee's ability to compete with the
licensor because only the licensee must pay a royalty"). The fallacy of this concern, See and Caprio
point out, is that it assumes the licensor and licensee are competitors. Id. at 848. This was not the case
in Brulotte, where the licensees were farmers using patented hop-picking machines, Brulotte, 379 U.S.
at 31-32, nor would it generally be the case when researchers are using another's research tool to
produce a new drug or therapeutic product.
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success of the new product developed through use of the tool. A reach-
through license agreement merely time-shifts the royalty payments to the
period when they are most accurately indicating the research tool's true
value to the user. That sales of the new product may extend beyond the life
of the underlying tool patent will be neither surprising nor unknown to the
patent owner and the tool user. Basing royalty payments on those sales
should not be construed as patent misuse or as an antitrust violation.
Reach-through royalty payments are prima facie reasonable so long as
the total time period over which they are paid is no longer than the term of
the underlying tool patent, i.e., a period of twenty years less the patent
application's pendency.3°0 This limitation assures the patentee of obtaining
full value for the researcher's use and satisfies the constitutional
requirement that exclusive rights in intellectual property are to be granted
only "for limited times. 3 °2
The reach-through royalty approach is less straightforward when the
non-consensual use of the patented research tool does not ultimately result
in a commercial product; in these cases there is no end result to be
"reached" as the royalty base. Nevertheless, the research tool user has
obtained a benefit. Unproductive dead-ends have been identified and can be
avoided in future research. The informational value of this understanding
should not be underestimated; indeed, it may represent the largest cost
component of other products that are ultimately developed and successfully
marketed.30 3 To the extent that a specific research tool can be identified as
instrumental in the development of a particular product, the royalty should
be based on that product. In situations where this is not possible, however,
a standardized schedule of royalty fees could be legislatively enacted. The
mechanical license for musical works protected by copyright law suggests
a possible model.3' Alternatively, a specialized administrative body similar
301. For example, if a research tool patent is applied for in the United States in 2000 and issues in
2002, it will expire in 2020 (absent other extensions or term adjustments) and have an enforceable life
of eighteen years. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (Supp. IV 1998). This Article proposes that reach-through
royalties be paid beginning with the date of the first sale of the product developed through use of the
patented tool, whenever that sale occurs, and ending eighteen years thereafter. The recovery period of
eighteen years has been time-shifted to correspond with the period of sales of the new product.
302. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
303. Gerth & Stolberg, supra note 166, at 1, 20 (stating that "only a small percentage" of $500
million average cost of developing new drug is attributable to actual development costs and that
balance represents "cost ... attributed to lost opportunities: years spent going down scientific 'dry
holes' and research money that could have generated interest had it been invested instead").
304. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (Supp. IV 1998) ("Scope of exclusive rights in nondramatic musical works:
Compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords'. Once the owner of a copyright in a
non-dramatic musical work has sold the work to the public, any other person has a compulsory license
to record and sell phonorecords of the same work. See generally MARSHALL LEAFFER,
UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 8.7 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining how copyright mechanical license
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to the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels could be created to adjudicate
royalty disputes. °5
Adopting the notion of a royalty that will reach-through to use the
downstream product as the royalty base, as proposed here, still leaves
undetermined the royalty rate to be applied to that base.3 6 The difficulty of
royalty quantification has been a leading argument against adoption of
compulsory licensing in the United States." 7 The determination of
appropriate rates can be a very complex and expensive process.0 ' Absent
operates). A monthlystatutory royalty must be paid to the copyright owner for each record distributed
under the license. Id. Many licensees negotiate rates below the statutory rate, which acts as a ceiling
price. Id.
305. 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-803 (Supp. IV 1998) (providing establishment and operation of Copyright
Arbitration Royalty Panels under Copyright Act). These panels, convened from time to time on
recommendation of the Register of Copyrights to determine royalty rates under copyright compulsory
licenses, replaced the now-defunct Copyright Royalty Tribunal in 1993. LEAnFER, supra note 304,
§§ 8.2-8.3.
Germany's patent laws provide for the determination of royalty payment by the German Patent
Office in cases where the patentee has declared willingness to grant licenses to all interested persons in
return for"reasonable compensation."See German PatentActof 16 December 1980, § 23(4), reprinted
in 2D SINNOTr Er AL., supra note 187, at WEST GERMANY-78.24; id. § 27(1) reprinted in 2D
SINNOTr ETAL., supra note 187, at WEST GERMANY-78.25 (providing for establishment in German
Patent Office of "Patent Division" for assessment of compensation under section 23).
306. DRATLER, supranote253, § 4.03 (defining "running royalties"ofintellectual propertyasbeing
determined by two quantities: either royalty rate, which is typically percentage amount; or royalty
base, which is subject matter to which royalty rate is applied to calculate total amount of royalty).
307. PENROSE, supra note 117, at 172 (listing lack ofway to determine what royalties are reasonable
as one of six primary arguments against compulsory licensing); see also Rai, supra note 37, at 141-42
(arguing that expanded experimental use exemption is problematic because courts are not well-
equipped to determine reasonable royalties for use of patented aspects of basic scientific research).
308. Patent infringement litigation against the federal government under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 provides
a vivid example of the considerable transaction costs involved in a reasonable royalty determination.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (Supp. IV 1998). The federal government cannot be enjoined from infringing
another's patent, and it is deemed to have condemned a license in the eminent domain sense when it
infringes. Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156,1166 (Ct. Cl. 1980). If the federal government is
found to have infringed, it must pay 'just compensation" for the taking in accordance with the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 1167 n. 17. The typical remedy for infringement by the government is a reasonable
royalty. Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 968 (Ct. Cl. 1979). The court in Leesona
explained that:
The nature of the property taken by the government in a patent infringement suit has traditionally
been a compulsory compensable license in the patent, and just compensation has in most cases
been defined by a calculation of a "reasonable royalty" for that license, or, when a reasonable
royalty cannot be ascertained, another method of estimating the value of the lost patent.
Id.
Because of the complexity of this determination, which frequently involves the testimony of
competing expert witnesses, litigation to determine reasonable royalties can consume a number of
years. An extreme example is the long-running Hughes Aircraft litigation against the federal
government, in which suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 was filed in 1973 and liability found on appeal in
1983. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The royalty rate was
determined by the trial court in 1994, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. UnitedStates, 31 Fed. Cl. 481 (1994), and
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evidence of an established royalty rate,3" the traditional method of
determining reasonable royalty in the patent litigation context involves
application of the multi-factor "hypothetical license negotiation"
framework of Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood.31 The
Patent Act provides that a "reasonable royalty" represents the minimum
amount of "compensation adequate to compensate for the infringement," 3
and invites the use of competing expert witnesses to assist the court in
making this determination." 2 Any such system, requiring elaborate
individual litigations and competing expert testimony, would involve
transaction costs far too high to be a solution of the research tools
accessibility dilemma.
Recent scholarship suggests alternative methods of royalty rate
determination that could short-circuit or at least simplify the elaborate
multi-factor hypothetical negotiation method. These alternative methods
could be adapted to a reach-through royalty approach where the royalty
base is the commercial product rather than the research tool itself."3 One
such method is a heuristic approach that involves payment of a royalty
computed as twenty-five percent of the licensee's pre-tax profit rate on its
the government's final certiorari petition denied in 1999, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 525
U.S. 1177 (1999).
309. It is unlikely that any established royalty rates would exist for patented research tools that have
not been widely licensed or sold in the marketplace.
310. 318 F. Supp. 1116,1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Former Federal Circuit ChiefJudge Howard Markey
has termed the challenge of applying the Georgia-Pacific factors to hypothesize a license negotiation
between willing parties an exercise in "fantasy and flexibility":
The methodology encompasses ... fantasy because it requires a court to imagine what warring
parties would have agreed to as willing negotiators; flexibility because it speaks of negotiations as
of the time infringement began, yet permits and often requires a court to look to events and facts
that occurred thereafter and that could not have been known to or predicted by the hypothesized
negotiators.
Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Markey, CJ.).
311. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994); see also Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en bane) (explaining that purpose of reasonable-royalty provision of § 284 is to "set a floor
below which damage awards may not fall").
312. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (providing that "[a] court may receive expert testimony as an aid to the
determination of damages or of what royalty would be reasonable under the circumstances').
313. Cf James G. Cullem, Panning for Biotechnology Gold: Reach-Through Royalty Damage
Awards for Infringing Uses of Patented Molecular Sieves, 39 IDEA 553, 562 (1999) (suggesting, in
context of determining damages for infringement of patented drug discovery tools, that licensor
demand for reach-through royalties is appropriately factored into hypothetical license negotiation
analysis of Georgia-Pacific); Richard S. Toikka, Patent Licensing Under Competitive and Non-
Competitive Conditions, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 279, 283 (2000) (stating that only
slight modifications are needed to adapt economic model of patent having claims that directly read on
patentee's product to case where patent covers technology or method used to make product).
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sales.'Y This twenty-five percent baseline figure may be "fine-tuned" as
necessary to the circumstances of each individual case I" and apportioned
between patent owners in the case of products developed through use of
multiple patented research tools.
Another method is known as the "analytical approach," which calculates
the reasonable royalty to be paid to the patentee as the difference between
the sales prices of the accused product and the sum of: (1) the infringer's
"direct or variable costs in the producing" the product; (2) the infringer's
"fixed costs, including allocated overhead to produce the article"; and (3)
"normal profits to the infringer on similar products." '316 Thus, the analytical
approach represents the "residual between the infringer's anticipated net
profit from practicing the infringed invention and the infringer's normal net
profit. 31 7 Reasonable royalty rates have also been estimated as a
percentage of the infringer's "net margin," i.e., its operating income before
taxes.
318
Despite the difficulties of assessing an appropriate royalty rate, the
challenge of royalty quantification may be more of a problem in theory
than practice. As foreign countries with compulsory licensing systems have
recognized, the mere enactment of laws that contemplate judicial or
administrative determination of licensing fees acts as an incentive to
314. The "twenty-five percent rule" was proposed by Robert Goldscheider based on his empirical
observations of several successful commercial license negotiations in the 1950s. Robert Goldscheider,
MeasuringDamages in U.S. PatentLitigation, 5 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 2,6-7 (May 1993) (explaining
that each licensee "earned about 20 percent pre-tax profit on sales and each paida5 percent royalty on
sales-or 25 percent of the pre-tax profitability rate"). But see Toikka, supra note 313, at 292-93
(criticizing rule as overly simplistic for applying twenty-five percent split to total gross profit without
distinguishing between monopoly profit and normal profit).
315. Goldscheider, supra note 314, at 7.
316. Id. The "analytical approach" was recognized and applied in TWMMfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 231
U.S.P.Q. 525,528 (E.D. Mich. 1985), af'd, 789 F.2d 895, 898-99 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (approving special
master's award of thirty percent royalty determined by analytical approach rather than entirety of
Georgia-Pacific factors).
Goldsheider warns that because it computes the royalty based on the value ofthe entire product sold
by the infringer, the analytical method is only appropriately used in circumstances where the "entire
market value" rule can be applied; i.e., where the patented component is part ofa larger product and it
is the patented component that creates purchaser demand of the product. Goldscheider, supra note 314,
at 8-9. Thus, the "analytical approach" would require modification if it were to be applied to compute
a reasonable royalty for use of a patented research tool not incorporated into the defendant's product.
317. Toikka, supra note 313, at 280 n.5.
318. John A. McMullen & David A. Halprin, A New TechniqueforQuantifyingReasonableRoyalty
from Appropriate Case Law, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'y 843,844 (1993) (assertingthat this
method "gives a relative, but quantitative, measure of the importance of the infringing activity to the
infringer's financial performance").
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voluntary licensing at more reasonable terms. 9 This phenomenon may
explain why few applications for compulsory licenses have actually been
made in Europe.32 By analogy, the mere fact of legislative or judicial
recognition in the United States of a broadened experimental use doctrine
as proposed herein may encourage consensual agreements to reasonable




The current narrow formulation of the experimental use doctrine in U.S.
patent jurisprudence, which limits exemption from infringement liability to
purely non-commercial, "philosophical" uses of patented inventions, means
that the defense is not available to the vast majority of users of patented
research tools. Many of these users are involved in collaborative efforts
between universities and industry that require proprietary research tools to
develop new therapeutic and diagnostic products, activity that by definition
will involve some degree of commercialization or profit expectation. The
proliferation of patents on research tools in the biotechnological and
biomedical sector has resulted in stacking royalty obligations and
heightened transaction costs that threaten to slow or stop the development
of new drugs and devices critical to public health.
A potential solution is a "liability rule" model that permits the non-
consensual "development use" of research tools not readily available for
licensing or purchase, while providing an ex post royalty payment to the
patent owner that would be correlated to the commercial value of the new
product developed from the non-consensual use. This "reach-through"
royalty approach provides the best approximation of the true worth of the
research tool to its user. It ensures a royalty award of sufficient amount to
maintain incentives for the development and patenting of new research
tools, yet alleviates the access restrictions and up-front costs currently
associated with acquisition and use of many proprietary research tools.
319. DRATLER, supra note 253, § 3.03[1][a] (contending that mere threat of royalty rate
determination by judicial or administrative officials "may have the effect of spurring private voluntary
transactions'); PENROSE, supra note 117, at 174-75 (explaining modest number of official
adjudications of reasonable royalty in compulsory licensing context).
320. PENROSE, supra note 117, at 175 n.25 (recognizing that compulsory licensing schemes in
Europe and Canada provide "every inducement for the patentee and the foreign concem desiring to use
the invention to get together and settle their differences").
321. Ayres & Talley, supra note 278, at 1094 (suggesting, in context of patented improvement
inventions, that if liability rule such as compulsory licensing were applied, traditional perceptions of
extensive litigation and courts' inability to tailor royalty amount would actually facilitate parties'
bargaining "on their own terms, not those dictated by the underlying liability rule").
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